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THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY IN PROMOTING 
SAFE GEOLOGIC SEQUESTRATION OF CO2 
DAVID E. ADELMAN & IAN J. DUNCAN† 
INTRODUCTION 
Deployment of new technologies is vital to climate change policy, 
but it invariably poses difficult tradeoffs. Carbon capture and storage 
(CCS), which involves the capture and permanent burial of CO2 
emissions, exemplifies this problem. Public acceptance of CCS faces 
an uphill battle. CCS lacks the green appeal of renewable sources of 
power, and disbelief is an all too common response of laypeople when 
they are told that billions of tons of CO2 can be stored underground 
for centuries. Further, despite its twin virtues of (relatively) low 
projected costs and enormous capacity to mitigate CO2 emissions, 
knowledgeable stakeholders often dismiss CCS as either unworkable 
or as an enabling technology for energy sources and industries that 
should be abandoned or retooled.1 
CCS is nevertheless promoted by a broad range of prominent 
stakeholders who assert that avoiding climate change will be 
impossible without it.2 Steven Chu, the U.S. Secretary of Energy, has 
argued that public support of CCS is critical and that the United 
States should “act with fierce urgency” to develop and deploy it.3 
Several prominent environmental organizations, including the 
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 1.  See, e.g., Chad Livengood, Missouri Utilities Seek Cap on Liability from Carbon 
Sequestration, Citizens Against CO2 Sequestration (May 25, 2009, 1:52 PM), 
http://citizensagainstco2sequestration.blogspot.com/2009/05/missouri-utilities-seek-cap-on .html; 
GREENPEACE INT’L, FALSE HOPE: WHY CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE WON’T SAVE THE 
CLIMATE 30–31(2008) [hereinafter GREENPEACE], available at http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/ 
Global/usa/report/2008/5/false-hope-why-carbon-capture.pdf. 
 2.  The economics alone are sobering. According to the International Energy Agency 
(IEA), the annual costs of cutting global CO2 emissions in half by 2050 would increase by 71% 
($1.28 trillion per year) without CCS. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY 
ANALYSIS: CO2 CAPTURE AND STORAGE: A KEY CARBON ABATEMENT OPTION 16 (2008) 
[hereinafter IEA], available at http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2008/CCS_2008.pdf. The 
IEA concludes, “CCS is therefore essential to the achievement of deep emission cuts.” Id. at 15. 
 3.  Steven Chu, Carbon Capture and Sequestration, 325 SCIENCE 1599, 1599 (2009). 
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Natural Resources Defense Council, the Environmental Defense 
Fund, and the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, have each 
endorsed CCS notwithstanding their aversion to coal-based power, 
which would be a primary beneficiary of this technology.4 Similarly, 
the European Commission, which has been a leader in global efforts 
to combat climate change, maintains that “we cannot reduce EU or 
world CO2 emissions by 50% in 2050 if we do not also use [CCS]” and 
has enacted a detailed directive to promote it.5 
The importance that stakeholders and governments attach to 
CCS is strongly associated with its scale, which could rival that of the 
largest industries on the planet. A single, mid-size coal-fired power 
plant emits about 3 million metric tons of CO2 per year.
6 The 
corresponding daily volume of compressed CO2 would fill a 
supertanker every 15 days,7 and scientists estimate that the subsurface 
CO2 plume would encompass an area of 240 square kilometers after 
40 years of operation.8 These numbers illustrate the acute need for 
large-scale technologies to mitigate CO2 emissions. However, the 
advantage of the enormous scale of CCS is also a source of 
stakeholder concern because it suggests that the risks are large as 
well.9 Thus, the large scale of CCS is simultaneously a necessity and 
an obstacle to its deployment. 
 
 4.  See, e.g., VELLO A. KUUSKRAA, A PROGRAM TO ACCELERATE DEPLOYMENT OF 
CO2 CAPTURE AND STORAGE (CCS): RATIONALES, OBJECTIVES, AND COSTS 7 (2007), 
available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/CCS-Deployment.pdf (arguing that “if the 
United States is to address global climate change in a meaningful way . . . [CCS] becomes a 
primary option”); David G. Hawkins et al., Carbon Capture and Storage: What To Do, 295 SCI. 
AM. 68, 75 (2006) (arguing that “[a]n integrated low-carbon energy strategy that incorporates 
[CCS] can reconcile substantial use of coal . . . with the imperative to prevent [climate 
change]”); Scott Anderson, Sequestering Carbon Deep Within the Earth, CLIMATE 411 BLOG 
(Mar. 3, 2008), http://blogs.edf.org/climate411/2008/03/03/geo-sequestration/ (asserting that 
“CCS is a critical transition technology”). 
 5.  Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the Geologic Storage of Carbon Dioxide and Amending Council Directives, at 1, COM (2008) 18 
final (Jan. 23, 2008), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do 
?uri=COM:2008:0018:FIN:EN:PDF. The European Union’s Directive on Geologic Storage of 
Carbon Dioxide was adopted on April 23, 2009. Council Directive 2009/31, 2009 O.J. (L 
140/114) (EN), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
OJ:L:2009:140:0114:0135:EN:PDF. 
 6.  See IEA, supra note 2, at 106. 
 7.  This assumes that the CO2 is being compressed to a pressure of 10 megapascals (MPa), 
which is typical of pressures in CO2 pipelines, and has a density of about 800 kilograms per cubic 
meter; the capacity of a supertanker, two million barrels of oil, is based on the largest class of 
such ships. 
 8.  IEA, supra note 2, at 106. 
 9.  See, e.g., GREENPEACE, supra note 1, at 30. 
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A combination of factors—including uncertainties about the cost 
of CCS, low public awareness and understanding of the technology 
and risks, and the many years it will take to commercialize—have 
contributed to the relative obscurity of CCS.10 In contrast to this lack 
of public engagement, an intense battle over CCS has erupted among 
policy analysts, technical experts, and lawyers.11 Beyond concerns 
about the high costs of capturing CO2, two issues have dominated the 
debate: (1) the risks posed by leakage of CO2 from sequestration sites, 
and (2) management of the long-term liabilities (possibly extending 
hundreds of years) associated with the sites.12 
Skeptical academics have also complained that no risk 
management framework has been devised that ensures funding will 
be available to take remedial action or to compensate victims for the 
effects of harmful releases from sequestration sites while also 
avoiding the problem of moral hazard.13 This conflict is alleged to 
arise because responsibility for sequestration sites will likely be 
ultimately transferred to a government entity for long-term 
stewardship.14 The incipient CCS industry has reinforced these fears 
by decrying the crippling effect that open-ended liability would have 
on CCS deployment,15 a position some prominent academics and 
advocates have accepted and often amplified.16 
 
 10.  See Filip Johnsson et al., Stakeholder Attitudes on Carbon Capture and Storage—An 
International Comparison, 4 INT’L J. GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL 410, 417 (2010); Jennie 
Stephens et al., Learning About Carbon Capture and Storage: Changing Stakeholder Perceptions 
with Expert Information, 1 ENERGY PROCEDIA 4655, 4656 (2009); U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2011 42 (2011), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/ 
pdf/0383%282011%29.pdf. 
 11.  See generally GREENPEACE, supra note 1, at 5; IEA, supra note 2, at 15–16. 
 12.  See infra Part I.A. 
 13.  See, e.g., Chiara Trabucchi et al., A Multi-Disciplinary Framework to Monetize 
Financial Consequences Arising from CCS Projects and Motivate Effective Financial 
Responsibility, 4 INT’L J. GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL 388, 388–89 (2010); GREENPEACE, 
supra note 1, at 30–31. 
 14.  See infra Part II. 
 15.  James A. Holtkamp, Models Studied for Long-Term Liability Risks in CCS, 24 NAT. 
GAS & ELECTRICITY 12, 12 (2008) (arguing that liability for long-term risks “is a major 
disincentive . . . to implement[ing] CCS on a commercial scale”); CCS ALLIANCE, STUDY OF 
LEGAL ISSUES RELATING TO RISK AND LIABILITY IN CONNECTION WITH CARBON CAPTURE 
AND STORAGE 58 (2008), available at http://www.huntonfiles.com/files/webupload/CCS_ 
liability_report_7.23.08.pdf (concluding that “uncertainty over long-term liability issues . . . has 
deterred project developers, financiers, and insurers”). 
 16.  See, e.g., David Hawkins et al., Twelve Years After Sleipner: Moving CCS From Hype 
to Pipe, 1 ENERGY PROCEDIA 4403, 4407 (2009); Elizabeth J. Wilson et al., Assessing a Liability 
Regime for Carbon Capture and Storage, 1 ENERGY PROCEDIA 4575, 4575 (2009) [hereinafter 
Wilson et al., Assessing]; IEA GREENHOUSE R&D PROGRAMME, EXPERT WORKSHOP ON 
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We argue that these fears are being fueled by misapprehensions 
about the risks posed by sequestration sites. A central challenge for 
CCS policy development is the potential for decision-makers to draw 
false analogies from prior experience. Controversial federal 
legislation, notably remediation of contaminated properties under 
Superfund and regulation of nuclear power under the Atomic Energy 
Act, have often framed the debate.17 However, while similarities exist, 
sequestration of CO2 does not present either the causal intricacies or 
the severity of harms that have defined these programs.18 
The primary risks from sequestration sites are negative impacts 
on drinking-water aquifers from either leakage of CO2 or intrusion of 
native salt-laden waters (brines), which could be driven upward from 
sequestration reservoirs by the elevated pressures that result from 
CO2 injection.
19 While contamination of drinking-water aquifers could 
trigger significant remediation costs, it is highly unlikely that these 
costs would be crippling,20 and the threats bear little resemblance to 
the large, chemically complex releases that made Superfund 
infamous.21 
These misunderstandings have been exacerbated by the focus of 
stakeholders—and until recently also of scientists—on CO2 leakage 
 
FINANCING CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE: BARRIERS AND SOLUTIONS 25–26 (2007). 
 17.  See, e.g., Mark A. de Figueiredo et al., Framing the Long-Term in Situ Liability Issue 
for Geologic Carbon Storage in the United States, 10 MITIGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES 
FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 647, 650, 652–53 (2005); Charles H. Haake & Karyn B. Marsh, The 
Trouble with Angels: Carbon Capture and Storage Hurdles and Solutions, BUREAU OF NAT’L 
AFFAIRS WORLD CLIMATE CHANGE REP., May 8, 2009, at 5–6; Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth 
J. Wilson, Climate Change and Carbon Sequestration: Assessing a Liability Regime for Long-
Term Storage of Carbon Dioxide, 58 EMORY L.J. 103, 128–32, 164–71 (2008). 
 18.  See infra Part III.B.2. 
 19.  See infra Part I.A. 
 20.  See JOHANNES E. KALUNKA ET AL., EFFECTS OF CO2 STORAGE IN SALINE AQUIFERS 
ON GROUND WATER SUPPLIES 7–9 (2010) (prepared for Society of Petroleum Engineers 
International Conference on CO2 Capture, Storage, and Utilization, New Orleans, Louisiana, 
November 10–11, 2010), available at http://www.onepetro.org/mslib/servlet/onepetropreview? 
id=SPE-139665-MS&soc=SPE (presenting simulations suggesting that large-scale sequestration 
of CO2 will have minimal impacts on overlying aquifers); see also Martin Iding & Philip 
Ringrose, Evaluating the Impact of Fractures on the Performance of the In Salah CO2 Storage 
Site, 4 INT’L J. GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL 242, 243 (2010); Youngsoo Lee et al., Analysis of 
the Leakage Possibility of Injected CO2 in a Saline Aquifer, 24 ENERGY FUELS 3292, 3297–98 
(2010). 
 21.  See Martha L. Judy & Katherine N. Probst, Superfund at 30, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 191, 
192–93 (describing “Love Canal” and “Valley of the Drums,” two prominent release sites that 
spurred adoption of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006) (CERCLA)). 
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alone.22 This oversight is in large part a product of evolving scientific 
understanding; only recently have new studies revealed that the most 
significant risks are likely to derive from releases of reservoir brines.23 
The most significant difference between releases of CO2 and brine is 
the geographic scope. While scientists estimate that CO2 plumes in 
sequestration reservoirs will extend several kilometers from a CO2 
injection well, they estimate that the area of elevated pressure in 
which brines could be forced into overlying aquifers will extend 
across tens of kilometers.24 
The larger areas involved and the indirect nature of the impacts 
will create unique challenges for effective regulation and novel 
factual settings for liability. However, the large scale of CO2 
sequestration is not entirely a negative, as large operations also offer 
economies of scale for regulation. And while impacts from releases 
could occur over vast areas, these impacts are well understood and 
relatively straightforward to mitigate, if not to prevent.25 Put 
differently, the risks are remarkably small relative to the volume of 
CO2 involved and the subsurface area covered by a typical 
sequestration site. 
Arguably, our most surprising conclusion is the modest role that 
common law liability is likely to play in promoting safe sequestration 
of CO2. The limiting factors are the types of harms, outlined above, 
and their timing. While the conventional belief among CCS advocates 
is that risks will decline rapidly in the decades after CO2 injection 
ends,26 new scientific studies are challenging this simple picture. These 
 
 22.  Quanlin Zhou et al., Modeling Basin- and Plume-Scale Processes of CO2 Storage for 
Full-Scale Deployment, 48 GROUND WATER 494, 495 (2010) (“[M]uch less effort has been 
devoted to studying transport phenomena of resident fluids (i.e., brine in saline aquifers) at a 
scale of sedimentary basins.”): see also Jens T. Birkholzer & Quanlin Zhou, Basin-Scale 
Hydrogeologic Impacts of CO2 Storage: Capacity and Regulatory Implications, 3 INT’L J. 
GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL 745, 746 (2009) (one of the recent studies evaluating the effects 
of CCS on brine displacement); Jean-Philippe Nicot, Evaluation of Large-Scale CO2 Storage on 
Fresh-Water Sections of Aquifers: An Example from the Texas Gulf Coast Basin, 2 INT’L J. 
GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL 582, 582–83 (2008) [hereinafter Nicot, Fresh-Water] (same). 
 23.  See infra Part I.B. 
 24.  KALUNKA ET AL., supra note 20, at 5, 8–9; see also infra Part I.B. 
 25.  See infra Part I.B. 
 26.  See, e.g., WORLD RES. INST., CCS GUIDELINES: GUIDELINES FOR CARBON DIOXIDE 
CAPTURE, TRANSPORT, AND STORAGE 55 (2008); ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA430-R-08-009, 
TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: VULNERABILITY EVALUATION FRAMEWORK FOR 
GEOLOGIC SEQUESTRATION OF CARBON DIOXIDE 44 (2008) [hereinafter EPA], available at 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads/VEF-Technical_Document_ 
072408.pdf (arguing that post-injection wells will still pose small leakage risks, but not to the 
extent that could affect human health); Chiara Trabucchi & Lindene Patton, Storing Carbon: 
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studies have demonstrated that geologic features such as faults and 
reservoir permeability, and human infrastructure such as abandoned 
wells, will create a mix of near- and long-term risks, some of which 
could persist for many decades.27 
The combination of risks with different temporal profiles will 
limit the role that liability can play. Economists have long recognized 
that market mechanisms are poorly suited to mitigating risks with 
long latency periods.28 Reasons for this shortcoming include economic 
discounting, the short-term focus of business planning, and the 
limited tenure of business executives.29 The timing of risks is therefore 
an important constraint, as liability regimes are better at managing 
near-term risks. More to the point, if long-term liability offers only 
nominal deterrence, then the specter of moral hazard and CCS 
industry fears about open-ended liability that have received so much 
attention are groundless. 
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of 
CCS, focusing on geologic sequestration, and analyzes the scientific 
work on the potential for releases of CO2 and brine from 
sequestration reservoirs. Part II evaluates the comparative 
advantages of government regulation and common law liability; this 
background leads into a critical analysis of current concerns about 
long-term liability and moral hazard. Part III examines the relative 
efficiencies of different doctrines of common law liability when 
applied to likely releases from sequestration sites. We find support 
for negligence and strict liability, but the deterrence value of both 
doctrines will be limited to a subset of important near-term risks. 
Collectively these sections demonstrate that the current debate 
misdiagnoses the primary risks and overlooks operational factors that 
simplify application of common law liability. In part IV we propose a 
hybrid legal framework that combines a traditional regulatory regime 
 
Options for Liability Risk Management, Financial Responsibility, BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, 
DAILY ENV’T REP., Sept. 3, 2008, at 11–13, available at http://www.indecon.com/ 
iec_web/expertise/ BNACCSFR_9032008.pdf. 
 27.  See Frank B. Walton et al., Geological Storage of CO2: A Statistical Approach to 
Assessing Performance and Risk, in PROCEEDINGS OF 7TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES (E.S. Rubin et al. eds., 2004), available at 
http://www.granite.mb.ca/~sheppard/GHGT7.pdf (asserting the possibility of brine intrusion 
hundreds of years after initial injection); Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 13; infra Part I.B. 
 28.  See Robert L. Rabin, Environmental Liability and the Tort System, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 
27, 43 (1987) (listing “long gestation” as a factor that undercuts the deterrent effect of tort 
liability). 
 29.  See infra Part II.A. 
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with a novel two-tiered system of liability that is calibrated to 
objective site characteristics. This framework balances principles of 
economic efficiency and the realities of political viability. 
I.  TIMING AND MAGNITUDE OF THE RISKS POSED BY CARBON 
SEQUESTRATION 
The basic elements of CCS are straightforward enough to 
describe at a general level. CO2 is captured from the flue gas of an 
industrial source (such as a power plant, oil refinery, or cement kiln), 
compressed into a supercritical fluid30 for transportation to a 
sequestration site, and then injected into a deep brine reservoir, 
typically 3,000 to 10,000 feet underground, for permanent disposal.31 
Although the capture and compression of CO2 are responsible for the 
bulk of the costs and many of the most challenging technological 
hurdles for CCS,32 geologic sequestration of CO2 has raised the most 
contentious legal and policy issues. 
This one-sided focus on geologic sequestration likely stems from 
the similarities of CO2 capture systems to other large-scale chemical 
processing facilities, with which people are familiar, whereas few 
people have experience with underground disposal of chemicals. The 
public’s unfamiliarity owes much to the inherent obscurity of 
subsurface waste disposal, which is carried out in some industries 
(mostly by the oil and chemical sectors) at levels that are comparable 
to or exceed those anticipated for CCS.33 This focus has also been 
 
 30.  Supercritical CO2 has the properties of low viscosity and density relative to standard 
liquids and, most importantly here, water. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 2010 CARBON 
SEQUESTRATION ATLAS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 26 (3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter 
DOE ATLAS], available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/carbon_seq/refshelf/atlasIII/ 
2010atlasIII.pdf. 
 31.  For the practical purpose of limiting its volume, sequestration of CO2 is limited to 
depths below 800 to 1500 meters (2600 to 4900 feet), depending on the geologic conditions. 
Chin-Fu Tsang et al., Scientific Considerations Related to Regulation Development for CO2 
Sequestration in Brine Formations, 42 ENVTL. GEOLOGY 275, 277 (2002). 
 32.  Sally M. Benson & Terry Surles, Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage: An Overview 
with Emphasis on Capture and Storage in Deep Geological Formations, 94 PROC. IEEE 1795, 
1802 (2006) (noting that approximately 75% of the costs of CCS are attributable to the capture 
and compression of CO2). Current best estimates indicate that the total costs of CCS will be $20 
to $70 per metric ton of CO2, which translates to increases of $0.01 to $0.05 per kilowatt-hour 
(kWh) for electric power from coal-fired power plants. For a typical plant, the projected cost 
increase is $0.025 per kWh, which is approximately 50% above current base-load costs. Id. 
 33.  Curtis M. Oldenburg et al., Certification Framework Based on Effective Trapping for 
Geological Carbon Sequestration, 3 INT’L J. GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL 444, 445 (2009) 
[hereinafter Oldenburg et al., Certification Framework]. For example, the quantity of 
contaminated water produced from oil and gas in Texas was 850 metric tons in 2002, which is 
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inflamed by dramatic, though not representative, incidents involving 
rapid releases of CO2, most notably the death of more than 1700 
people when a huge bubble of CO2 from an underlying volcanic 
source was released from Lake Nyos in Cameroon.34 
The massive volumes of CO2 produced globally are, by most 
accounts, more than matched by the available subsurface storage 
space in geologic reservoirs.35 Various benchmarks are used to 
illustrate the magnitude of national and global carbon emissions. In 
the United States, for example, using CCS to eliminate 50% of CO2 
emissions from the current fleet of coal-fired power plants would 
involve transporting and sequestering a volume of CO2 roughly equal 
to the volume of oil consumed annually.36 Similarly, at the global 
level, sequestering just 15% of aggregate CO2 emissions would 
require infrastructure that could handle volumes of CO2 that exceed 
those of world oil production.37 
Recent estimates indicate that depleted oil and gas reservoirs 
could store 900 to 1200 gigatons of CO2 (one gigaton (Gt) is one 
billion metric tons), while the capacity of deep saline reservoirs is 
conservatively projected to exceed 1000 Gt of CO2 and is probably 
much greater.38 Given that annual global emissions of CO2 are 
currently about 30 Gt,39 the estimated capacity of deep brine 
reservoirs is sufficient to sequester the equivalent of 30 to 40 years of 
total global CO2 emissions or approximately 75 to 125 years of the 
 
more than double the amount of CO2 (equivalent to about 370 metric tons of water) emitted by 
Texas power plants. Nicot, Fresh-Water, supra note 22, at 583. Some municipalities also dispose 
of large volumes of wastewater via deep underground injection. Id. 
 34.  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON 
CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE 211 (Bert Metz et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter IPCC], 
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srccs/srccs_wholereport.pdf (concluding that 
the release of CO2 from Lake Nyos is “not representative of the seepage through wells or 
fractures that may occur from underground geological storage sites”). 
 35.  Franklin M. Orr, Jr., Onshore Geologic Storage of CO2, 325 SCIENCE 1656, 1656–57 
(2009) (finding that “[e]stimates of worldwide potential storage capacity range from 1700 to 
almost 11,000 gigatons of CO2”). Please note that this discussion does not include alternative 
modes of geologic sequestration, such as storage of CO2 in depleted oil fields or in un-minable 
coal beds, which would augment the capacity for geologic sequestration of CO2 described here. 
 36.  Daniel P. Schrag, Making Carbon Capture and Storage Work, in ACTING IN TIME ON 
ENERGY POLICY 46 (Kelly Sims Gallagher ed., 2009). 
 37.  Birkholzer & Zhou, supra note 22, at 745. 
 38.  Benson & Surles, supra note 32, at 1796; see also IPCC, supra note 34, at 34 (estimating 
global capacity of brine reservoirs is at least 1000 Gt of CO2); IEA, supra note 2, at 106 
(estimating global capacity of brine reservoirs to be 2000 to 20,000 Gt of CO2). 
 39.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INT’L ENERGY OUTLOOK 7 (2010). 
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emissions from the power sector.40 Despite the large reservoir 
capacities available, constraints on carbon-capture technologies, 
limited funding, and high construction costs will limit the use of CCS 
to a fraction of its storage potential, making it viable as a bridge 
technology for substantially longer than these estimates suggest.41 
Geologic sequestration occurs in tiny cavities, or “pore spaces,” 
that are intrinsic to most sedimentary rocks.42 At a crude level of 
description, the Earth’s crust consists of two basic types of rock—
igneous and sedimentary. As the latter name suggests, sedimentary 
rocks are formed from thick accumulations of sand, clay, salts, and silt 
over millions of years. The resulting rock is interspersed with porous 
and permeable layers (sand) as well as impermeable layers (clay, silt, 
salt).43 Basins of sedimentary rock typically contain thousands of cubic 
meters of porous sediments that are filled with water that is saltier 
than seawater (hence these basins are called “brine reservoirs”).44 The 
layers of clay, silt, and salt provide impermeable “cap rock” that is a 
natural barrier to movement of CO2, which would otherwise be 
carried upward as it is more buoyant than water.45 Injected CO2, 
which displaces the brine in a sedimentary formation,46 will be 
permanently immobilized by chemical processes (for example, by 
dissolution into the brine) that operate on timescales ranging from 
tens to hundreds of years.47 
Despite encouraging statistics and science, the proposal to bury 
billion of tons of CO2 underground for centuries is understandably 
viewed as a dubious form of geoengineering by some. In fact, this 
kind of response ought to be expected because few people have 
experience with large-scale industries, and fewer still are comfortable 
with the geological scales of carbon sequestration. And yet substantial 
 
 40.  This second calculation assumes that the electric power sector accounts for forty 
percent of global CO2 emissions. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, CO2 EMISSIONS FROM FUEL 
COMBUSTION: HIGHLIGHTS 9 (2010), available at http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/ 
co2highlights.pdf. 
 41.  IPCC, supra note 34, at 33, 43–46. 
 42.  Id. at 31–32. 
 43.  Benson & Surles, supra note 32, at 1799–1800. 
 44.  Sally M. Benson & David Cole, CO2 Sequestration in Deep Sedimentary Formations, 4 
ELEMENTS 325, 326–28 (2008). 
 45.  Benson & Surles, supra note 32, at 1800; Tsang et al., supra note 31, at 278–79. 
 46.  IPCC, supra note 34, at 31. 
 47.  Id. at 32 (describing how multiple processes—including retention by cap rock, 
dissolution of CO2 in native brines, capillary trapping, and mineral trapping—will independently 
operate to retain CO2 in deep brine reservoirs,); see also Tsang et al., supra note 31, at 279; 
Benson & Surles, supra note 32, at 1800. 
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precedent exists for carbon sequestration in natural and industrial 
settings. 
The trapping capacity of sedimentary basins has been 
exhaustively studied, in part because oil, gas, and CO2 have been 
naturally trapped in sedimentary formations for millions of years.48 As 
alluded to above, industries have been storing and disposing of liquids 
and gases underground without causing significant releases for 
decades.49 Supercritical CO2 has itself been used for nearly four 
decades to facilitate oil production. This process also involves 
pumping large volumes of CO2 underground, and its safety record is 
excellent.50 Moreover, the technologies needed for drilling into deep 
brine reservoirs, injecting CO2,
51 and monitoring sequestration sites 
are well developed, although more elaborate site characterization and 
monitoring will be required to deploy CCS at full scale.52 Thus, 
despite its apparent novelty, sequestration of CO2 in geologic 
formations is not a wildly speculative gambit, but is instead based on 
extensive (though clearly still evolving) scientific work and years of 
engineering experience with technically similar projects. 
A.  Types of Risks 
Like any complex engineering problem, especially one reliant on 
the difficult-to-access details of subsurface geology, CO2 sequestration 
projects will not be risk-free. The potential risks are, however, 
relatively well understood and expected to be manageable, 
particularly in comparison to the technical uncertainties typical of 
terrestrial sequestration of CO2.
53 Most scientists believe that releases 
of CO2 or brines into groundwater will be the two major sources of 
environmental risk,54 although some scientists have also suggested 
 
 48.  Benson & Surles, supra note 32, at 1800. 
 49.  Id.; see also Tsang et al., supra note 31, at 279. 
 50.  Ian J. Duncan et al., Risk Assessment for Future CO2 Sequestration Projects Based on 
CO2 Enhanced Oil Recovery in the U.S., 1 ENERGY PROCEDIA 2037, 2037 (2009). 
 51.  IPCC, supra note 34, at 32–33. 
 52.  Id. at 34; Tsang et al., supra note 31, at 279–80 (“[M]uch more extensive evaluation of 
the integrity of caprock and the existence of possible faults and fractures is needed.”). 
 53.  IPCC, supra note 34, at 375 (describing the comparative advantages of CO2 
sequestration in deep brine reservoirs over sequestration in the terrestrial biosphere); J.J. 
Hutchinson et al., Some Perspectives on Carbon Sequestration in Agriculture, 142 AGRIC. & 
FOREST METEOROLOGY 288, 289–90 (2007); Klass & Wilson, supra note 17, at 167 (observing 
that “CCS risks are generally understood and likely manageable”). 
 54.  See, e.g., S. Julio Friedmann, Geological Carbon Dioxide Sequestration, 3 ELEMENTS 
179, 182–83 (2007); Michael Stenhouse et al., Assessing Environmental Impacts from Geological 
CO2 Storage, 1 ENERGY PROCEDIA 1895, 1900 (2009). See generally IPCC, supra note 34, at 
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that seismic activity could be induced by CO2 injection.
55 Even they 
acknowledge, though, that seismicity is unlikely and is preventable 
with proper siting, installation, and monitoring.56 
We will focus on the risks posed by releases of CO2 and brine. 
The most significant form of environmental harm from such releases 
is predicted to be contamination of drinking water by, for example, 
mobilization of toxic metals or increased salinity.57 While other harms 
are possible, such as asphyxiation from CO2 accumulating in the 
basements of buildings or CO2 in soils killing plants,
58 they are 
believed to be of secondary importance due to their very remote 
likelihood.59 Taking into account singular events like the release of 
CO2 from Lake Nyos, little or no evidence exists that direct 
atmospheric releases of CO2 could be a significant threat to humans.
60 
 
247–48 (discussing risks to groundwater from CO2 and brine leakage); KATE ROBERTSON ET 
AL., INTERNATIONAL CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE PROJECTS: OVERCOMING LEGAL 
BARRIERS 9 (2006), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/energy-analyses/pubs/ 
ccsregulatorypaperfinalreport.pdf (noting the importance and difficulty of designing wells to 
prevent seepage). 
 55.  See, e.g., Christian D. Klose, Human-Triggered Earthquakes and Their Impacts on 
Human Security, in ACHIEVING ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY: ECOSYSTEM SERVICES AND 
HUMAN WELFARE 14 (P.H. Liotta et al. eds., 2010); Joel Sminchak & Neeraj Gupta, Issues 
Related to Seismic Activity Induced by the Injection of CO2 in Deep Saline Aquifers, 2 J. 
ENERGY & ENVTL. RES. 32, 39–40 (2002), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/ 
journals/vol2_no1.pdf. 
 56.  Sminchak & Gupta, supra note 55 at 32, 40; Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 11 
(“[S]ome [risks] are low frequency and catastrophic in nature, while others are recurring and of 
modest severity.”). 
 57.  See Duncan et al., supra note 50, at 2037–38; KALUNKA ET AL., supra note 20, at 8–9; 
Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 11 (concluding that water resources are at risk if either 
CO2 or brines escape the sequestration reservoir); J.A. Apps et al., Evaluation of Potential 
Changes in Groundwater Quality in Response to CO2 Leakage from Deep Geologic Storage, 82 
TRANSP. POROUS MEDIA 215, 216 (2010) (explaining that dissolution of CO2 in aquifers can 
release toxic heavy metals). 
 58.  See Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 10–11; IPCC, supra note 34, at 34–35. 
 59.  In a recent simulation study involving leakage from an abandoned well, scientists 
found that the likelihood of impacts on human health in buildings was negligible and that 
ecosystem impacts were either negligible or highly localized around the area of leakage. 
Oldenburg et al., Certification Framework, supra note 33, at 454–55. Plausible leakage rates 
were the equivalent of “driving a 20-[mile-per-gallon] car approximately 5 miles per day.” Id. at 
455. 
 60.  See, e.g., Karsten Pruess, On CO2 Fluid Flow and Heat Transfer Behavior in the 
Subsurface, Following Leakage from a Geologic Storage Reservoir, 54 ENVTL. GEOLOGY 1677, 
1684 (2008) (concluding that “leakage of CO2 from a deep geologic reservoir as such does not 
appear capable of producing a concentrated high-energy discharge at the land surface”); Jean-
Philippe Nicot & Ian J. Duncan, Science-Based Permitting of Geological Sequestration of CO2 in 
Brine Reservoirs in the U.S., 11 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 14, 21 (2008); ELIZABETH J. WILSON ET 
AL., WORLD RES. INST., WRI ISSUE BRIEF, CARBON CAPTURE AND SEQUESTRATION NO. 3: 
LIABILITY AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FRAMEWORKS FOR CARBON CAPTURE AND 
Adelman_FINAL (Do Not Delete) 2/5/2012 5:58 PM 
12 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 22:1 
Abandoned wells and faults in cap rock are believed to be the 
primary pathways for releases of CO2 or brine.
61 The risk of leakage 
through abandoned wells arises because wellbores can corrode and 
cements can chemically degrade over time.62 At the extremes, releases 
could be near term and involve large volumes of CO2, such as a 
release from a poorly capped well in the immediate vicinity of a CO2 
injection well, or they could involve very slow leaks, for example, 
through small, undetected subsurface faults in sedimentary cap rock.63 
Experts believe that careful site selection and characterization, along 
with early-detection systems for leakage, can reduce the impacts of 
such releases.64 
 
SEQUESTRATION 3 (2007) [hereinafter WILSON ET AL., LIABILITY], available at 
http://pdf.wri.org/liability-and-financial-responsibility.pdf (concluding that “properly planned 
and operated CCS projects are extremely unlikely to threaten human life”); IPCC, supra note 
34, at 34. 
 61.  Mark A. de Figueiredo et al., Regulating Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage 9 (MIT 
Ctr. for Energy and Envtl. Policy, Working Paper No. 3, 2007), available at 
http://web.mit.edu/ceepr/www/publications/workingpapers/2007-003.pdf (concluding that 
“[p]robably the most likely mechanism for loss of containment would be via abandoned wells.”); 
IPCC, supra note 34, at 372 (“The probabilities of physical leakage are estimated to be small 
and the risks are mainly associated with leakage from well casings of abandoned wells.”); 
Yingqui Zhang et al., Probability Estimation of CO2 Leakage Through Faults at Geologic 
Carbon Sequestration Sites, 1 ENERGY PROCEDIA 41, 41 (2009); KALUNKA ET AL., supra note 
20, at 8–9; EPA, supra note 26, at 45. 
 62.  S. TAKU IDE ET AL., CO2 LEAKAGE THROUGH EXISTING WELLS: CURRENT 
TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATIONS 5–6 (2006), available at http://sequestration.mit.edu/ 
pdf/GHGT8_Ide.pdf (concluding that CO2 leakage through wells remains a “substantial risk” in 
geologic sequestration projects); Barbara G. Kutchko et al., Degradation of Well Cement by 
CO2 Under Geologic Sequestration Conditions, 41 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 4787, 4791 (2007) 
(“Although it is clear that cement is degraded by exposure to CO2 . . . the degradation processes 
involved are slow.”); Walter Crow et al., Wellbore Integrity Analysis of a Natural CO2 Producer, 
1 ENERGY PROCEDIA 3561, 3568 (concluding that “cement systems can be used effectively in 
creating suitable barrier systems for long-term CO2 storage operations, if good practices are 
employed during well construction”). 
 63.  IPCC, supra note 34, at 34; KALUNKA ET AL., supra note 20, at 8–9. Limitations in the 
resolution of existing methods for mapping subsurface faults preclude identifying many small 
faults. CURTIS M. OLDENBURG ET AL., RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK FOR GEOLOGIC 
CARBON SEQUESTRATION SITES 4 (2010), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/ 8297g3k2 
[hereinafter OLDENBURG ET AL., RISK ASSESSMENT]; Alv-Arne Grimstad et al., Modelling and 
Simulation of Mechanisms for Leakage of CO2 from Geologic Storage, 1 ENERGY PROCEDIA 
2511, 2512 (2009) (arguing that “[d]iffuse leakage through fractures or pore-space of the cap-
rock . . . will be more difficult to detect and remedy. These mechanisms may therefore be the 
largest contributor to leakage of stored CO2,” but also the slowest.); Jens T. Birkholzer et al., 
Large-Scale Impact of CO2 Storage in Deep Saline Aquifers: A Sensitivity Study on Pressure 
Response in Stratified Systems, 3 INT’L J. GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL 181, 182 (2009). 
 64.  IPCC, supra note 34, at 34; Curtis M. Oldenburg, Screening and Ranking Framework 
for Geologic CO2 Storage Site Selection on the Basis of Health, Safety, and Environmental Risk, 
54 ENVTL. GEOLOGY 1687, 1687 (2008) [hereinafter Oldenburg, Screening] (observing that, 
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B.  CO2 Plumes and Brine Displacement in Sequestration Reservoirs 
The two primary sources of risk to groundwater—direct release 
of CO2 and pressure-driven intrusion of brines—have significantly 
different risk profiles.65 While the elevated pressures associated with 
injection of CO2 cause movement of both CO2 and brine, the pressure 
field will have effects far beyond the maximum extent of the CO2 
plume.66 These pressure effects will cause subsurface fluid flow, which, 
depending on the permeability and morphology of the sedimentary 
basin, could cause reservoir brines to be forced through an upward 
sloping sedimentary rock layer that leads to nearby or (more likely) 
distant wells used for drinking water.67 Releases could also occur 
when either a CO2 plume or brine within a zone of elevated pressure 
encounters a fault in the cap rock or an abandoned well that is 
incompletely capped.68 
The risks associated with leakage of CO2 and movement of brine 
into aquifers will not be identical in magnitude or timing. Leakage of 
CO2 will not be dependent on the elevated pressures around an 
injection well, as the buoyancy of CO2 is sufficiently high to drive it to 
 
other than site operation decisions, “the best way to avoid unintended leakage and seepage is to 
choose a good site at the outset”); VELLO A. KUUSKRAA, COST-EFFECTIVE REMEDIATION 
STRATEGIES FOR STORING CO2 IN GEOLOGIC FORMATIONS 1 (2009) (prepared for Society of 
Petroleum Engineers International Conference on CO2 Capture, Storage, and Utilization, San 
Diego, California, November 2–4, 2009), available at http://www.onepetro.org/mslib/ 
servlet/onepetropreview?id=SPE-126618-MS&soc=SPE; Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 
9 (observing that the magnitude of long-term risks “will depend on near-term decisions 
involving the siting and operation phases of the sequestration process”). 
 65.  See, e.g., Jean-Philippe Nicot et al., Investigation of Water Displacement Following 
Large CO2 Sequestration Operations, 1 ENERGY PROCEDIA 4411, 4411 (2009) [hereinafter 
Nicot et al., Investigation]; Nicot, Fresh-Water, supra note 22, at 582–84; Jean-Philippe Nicot et 
al., Pressure Perturbations from Geologic Carbon Sequestration: Area-of-Review Boundaries and 
Borehole Leakage Driving Forces, 1 ENERGY PROCEDIA 47, 54 (2009) [hereinafter Nicot et al., 
Pressure]; Birkholzer et al., supra note 63, at 182–83. 
 66.  See, e.g., Birkholzer et al., supra note 63, at 193; Nicot et al., Investigation, supra note 
65, at 4413; KALUNKA ET AL., supra note 20, at 5. The EPA recognized the importance of brine 
intrusion and the large geographical area of elevated reservoir pressures prior to the publication 
of its final rules under the Safe Drinking Water Act that will govern sequestration site selection, 
operation, and closure. See Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control 
Program for Carbon Dioxide Geologic Sequestration Wells, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,230, 77,248–49 
(Dec. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 124, 144, 145, 146, & 147) (describing the EPA’s 
decision to expand the definition of the “area of review” for regulatory purposes to include the 
“associated pressure front” and “displaced fluids”). The EPA defines the “pressure front” as “a 
zone where there is a pressure differential sufficient to cause the movement of injected fluids or 
formations fluids into a USDW [underground source of drinking water].” Id. at 77,292. 
 67.  Birkholzer et al., supra note 63, at 193. 
 68.  Id. 
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the surface and to propel it laterally.69 By contrast, because brine 
intrusion is driven by elevated pressure, the potential area of risk in 
the reservoir will continue to expand for many decades after CO2 
injection ceases as the pressure in the reservoir equilibrates.70 The 
specific timing will be highly dependent on the rate of fluid flow. 
Reservoirs with low resistance will re-equilibrate relatively rapidly, 
whereas those with high resistance will sustain higher pressures 
around injection wells, and it will take much longer for the pressure 
fields to expand and dissipate.71 
The potential for CO2 or pressurized brine to encounter a 
transmissive fault or wellbore increases with subsurface area; as a 
consequence, the aggregate risk of releases will rise with the areal 
extent of both the CO2 plume and the zone of elevated pressure.
72 The 
risk of CO2 leakage will decline as chemical processes immobilize it, 
whereas the likelihood of brine intrusion will be solely a function of 
the pressure in the reservoir. Understanding the dynamics of CO2 
plumes and the spread of pressure from an injection well is therefore 
essential to understanding the primary risks associated with 
sequestration sites. 
The recognition that the pressure effects of CO2 injection will 
travel much more rapidly and for far greater distances than the CO2 
plume itself is arguably the single most important result of recent 
scientific work on geologic sequestration.73 In a 2008 simulation study 
 
 69.  Stefan Bachu, CO2 Storage in Geological Media: Role, Means, Status and Barriers to 
Deployment, 34 PROGRESS ENERGY & COMBUSTION SCI. 254, 265 (2008); Steven L. Bryant et 
al., Buoyancy-Dominated Multiphase Flow and Its Impacts on Geologic Sequestration of CO2, 
13 SOC’Y OF PETROLEUM ENGINEERS J. 447, 447 (2006), available at http://science. 
uwaterloo.ca/~mauriced/earth691-duss/CO2_General%20CO2%20Sequestration%20materilas 
/CO2_BRYANT_BuoyancyFlow%20and%20CO2%20Sequestration%202008_SPE-99938-PA-
P.pdf. 
 70.  See KALUNKA ET AL., supra note 20, at 7–8; Birkholzer et al., supra note 63, at 188–90. 
 71.  Birkholzer et al., supra note 63, at 182–83. 
 72.  KALUNKA ET AL., supra note 20, at 4–5, 7–9; Iding & Ringrose, supra note 20, at 242–
43; Nicot et al., Pressure, supra note 65, at 47–48. 
 73.  KALUNKA ET AL., supra note 20, at 9 (concluding that “[b]rine leakage and pressure 
changes, rather than CO2 migration, are the main problems associated with large-scale [carbon 
sequestration] . . . . [u]nless an abandoned well is within or laterally very near the CO2 plume, 
CO2 leakage is minimal”); Nicot, Fresh-Water, supra note 22, at 589–90 (concluding that “[t]he 
pressure pulse travels much faster than the mass of the CO2 plume”); Nicot et al., Pressure, 
supra note 65, at 47 (“[T]he influence of the zone of elevated pressure during injection on 
potential conduits such as well boreholes and faults could extend many kilometers from the 
injection site—much farther than the CO2 plume itself.”); Zhou et al., supra note 22, at 508 
(finding that “the pressure-affected pore volume is orders of magnitude larger than the 
subsurface pore volume affected by free-phase CO2”). 
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that incorporated detailed empirical data on subsurface conditions in 
Texas, the researchers found that 50 years after the end of active CO2 
injection, the CO2 plume would extend just 3 to 5 kilometers from the 
injection well, whereas the field of elevated pressure was projected to 
extend many tens of kilometers from the well.74 Several other 
independent models have generated similar results, with the CO2 
plumes spanning several kilometers and the much larger pressure 
fields extending tens of kilometers from injection wells.75 
A recent modeling study of particular note ran a series of 
simulations involving multiple injection wells in a reservoir located in 
Illinois.76 The simulations predicted that CO2 migration would be 
slow, on average 3.3 meters per year post-injection, such that in one 
representative simulation, the plume did not reach the cap rock after 
200 years.77 In the same study, the maximum lateral length of the CO2 
plumes was estimated to be 5.5 km (about 3 miles) after 50 years and 
just 13.5 km (8 miles) after 200 years, with no direct plume 
interference between storage sites during this period.78 The 
simulations also found that after 200 years “the vast majority of the 
injected CO2 [was] contained via residual and solubility trapping, 
leaving only 13% as mobile phase.”79 This result suggests that the risk 
of CO2 leakage can drop dramatically within the first hundred or so 
years after a site transitions to permanent closure and long-term 
management (often referred to as “long-term stewardship”). 
The Illinois basin study adds further support for the importance 
of brine intrusion, despite predicting that reservoir pressure would 
drop rapidly and then plateau at about 100 years after the end of CO2 
 
 74.  Nicot, Fresh-Water, supra note 22, at 589–90. 
 75.  KALUNKA ET AL., supra note 20, at 4–5; see also Seyyed M. Ghaderi et al., Feasibility 
of Injecting Large Volumes of CO2 into Aquifers, 1 ENERGY PROCEDIA 3113, 3117–18 
(modeling a CO2 plume radius of 4.6 kilometers and a pressure field of 65 kilometers after 50 
years of injecting CO2); Lee et al., supra note 20, at 3296–97; Mark Person et al., Assessment of 
Basin-Scale Hydrologic Impacts of CO2 Sequestration, Illinois Basin, 4 INT’L J. GREENHOUSE 
GAS CONTROL 840, 851–52 (2010); M. WINKLER ET AL., THE DYNAMIC ASPECT OF 
FORMATION STORAGE USE FOR CO2 SEQUESTRATION 10 (2010) (prepared for Society of 
Petroleum Engineers International Conference on CO2 Capture, Storage, and Utilization, New 
Orleans, Louisiana, November 10–11, 2010), available at http://www.onepetro.org/ 
mslib/servlet/onepetropreview?id=SPE-139730-MS&soc=SPE. 
 76.  Zhou et al., supra note 22, at 500 (describing the study, which involved twenty injection 
wells spaced, on average, about 30 km apart, with each well injecting 5 Mt per year of CO2 over 
50 years). 
 77.  Id. at 504. 
 78.  Id. at 503–04. 
 79.  Id. at 506. 
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injection.80 The model simulations projected that the areas of elevated 
pressure sufficient to cause brine intrusion would extend 150 km from 
the injection wells.81 The areas of elevated pressure also spread 
quickly; interactions between wells were found within half a year, and 
reservoir pressure effects (which extended beyond the 275 km radius) 
were indivisible between the twenty wells by the end of 50 years of 
active CO2 injection.
82 
This study also simulated the effects of faults in cap rock, of 
leaky abandoned wells, and of flow outside of the model boundary. 
The model predicted very little brine movement of any kind (that is, 
flow through cap rock breaches or the lateral boundaries of the 
model) over the first 50 years of operation.83 Moreover, although the 
movement of brine rose rapidly in the simulations over the 50 year 
injection period (reaching a maximum rate after 63 years), movement 
of brine was not the primary mechanism for accommodating the 
injected CO2 until more than 150 years after injection was initiated.
84 
It was not until 200 years had passed that leakage through faults and 
abandoned wells in the core injection area accounted for 
approximately one-third of the brine displaced by the injected CO2, 
but even with the substantial volumes of brine mobilized, the great 
depth of the reservoir mitigated any impacts on overlying aquifers.85 
Similar results were obtained by other researchers using a different 
model and alternative assumptions; they estimated delays for 
detectable impacts on overlying aquifers of 50 to 150 years after CO2 
injection had ceased.86 
The results of these recent studies have important implications 
for regulatory policies and potential liabilities associated with 
sequestration sites. At the broadest level, the potential for brine 
intrusion into valuable sources of drinking water may be the factor 
that determines the capacity and hence the viability of sequestration 
sites.87 The enormous subsurface areas of elevated pressure around 
 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  See id. at 507 fig.8. 
 82.  Birkholzer & Zhou, supra note 22, at 750. 
 83.  Zhou et al., supra note 22, at 509 (finding that cumulative leakage accounted for just 
9.5% of the displaced brine over the first 50 years of injection, with the remaining 90% offset by 
changes in pore-space volume caused by the elevated reservoir pressures). 
 84.  Id. at 509–10 (finding that it was not until 200 years after injection that cumulative 
leakage accounted for 62% of brine displacement in the reservoir). 
 85.  Id. at 511. 
 86.  KALUNKA ET AL., supra note 20, at 8–9. 
 87.  Birkholzer & Zhou, supra note 22, at 746 (concluding that the impacts from brine flow 
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sequestration sites will exacerbate the regulatory burdens and the 
technical challenges of site characterization because areas of 
regulatory significance could exceed 100,000 square km for a single 
site.88 Similarly, because zones of elevated pressure will extend far 
beyond a given injection well, and interactions between them will 
arise rapidly, permitting of sequestration sites should be coordinated 
across different wells.89 
If the recent scientific work is borne out, liability for releases of 
brine from a sequestration reservoir with multiple injection sites will 
be indivisible within a few years after the start of CO2 injection.
90 
Further, because brine intrusion is driven by elevated pressures, 
which spread rapidly and can persist for many decades, no 
ascertainable transport of a substance (water and salt molecules are 
perfectly fungible) will occur across the reservoir. This is as pure an 
example of indivisible causation for a tort as one could expect to 
find.91 By contrast, the CO2 plumes are projected to remain localized 
for many decades, thereby minimizing the potential for physical 
overlap and avoiding divisibility problems with assigning liability. 
These results expose the heightened risks presented by releases of 
brine from sequestration reservoirs. They are both more probable 
and likely to be of longer duration than releases of CO2, and the 
degree to which concerns about direct leakage of CO2 have been 
overemphasized and ought to be reassessed. 
The emerging scientific work on sequestration of CO2 and 
decades of experience in the oil and gas industries demonstrate that 
uncertainties about risks will remain even under the best 
circumstances.92 This should not be read to preclude bounded 
estimates of risks, as several recent efforts to formulate risk 
assessment frameworks indicate that such estimates are feasible.93 
 
may be “the limiting factor determining the CO2 sequestration capacity in large sedimentary 
basins”). 
 88.  Id. at 754. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Indivisible causation involves circumstances in which the contributions of different 
defendants to an alleged harm cannot be separated from each other. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE 
LAW OF TORTS 422–23 (2001) [hereinafter DOBBS, TORTS]. 
 92.  OLDENBURG ET AL., RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 63, at 10. 
 93.  See, e.g., id.; O. BOUC ET AL., CO2
 
GEOLOGICAL STORAGE SAFETY ASSESSMENT: 
METHODOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS 10–12 (2010) (prepared for 10th International 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment & Management Conference, Seattle, Washington, June 7–11, 
2010), available at http://hal-brgm.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/50/25/92/PDF/PSAM10-
BOUC_vfin.pdf; Lisa Bacanskas et al., Toward Practical Application of the Vulnerability 
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These works suggest that established methods of subsurface 
characterization and modeling should be able to provide reasonable 
estimates of potential risks. Relatively simple metrics, such as the 
number of wells in the area, the density of faults, and the permeability 
of a reservoir, can be used in intuitively tractable and transparent 
models to establish conservative upper bounds for the most important 
sources of risk from sequestration sites.94 
C.  Sequestration of CO2 and Carbon Accounting 
The monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) of CO2 
emissions offsets is among the most politically contentious and 
technically challenging issues impeding global efforts to address 
climate change.95 The limited experience that exists for offsetting CO2 
emissions suggests that MRV for other forms of climate change 
mitigation (such as reforestation projects) is likely to be even more 
technically complex and politically divisive than for CCS. 
Against this backdrop, CCS has a number of relative virtues, 
even if the potential challenges of accurately determining leakage 
rates from sequestration reservoirs are taken into account. At the 
outset, the large scale of CCS systems makes them a relatively easy 
target for regulation, and unlike many forms of terrestrial 
sequestration,96 the amount of CO2 that is captured and sequestered 
underground is susceptible to direct measurement that is both precise 
and accurate.97 Scientists are also confident that leakage of CO2 from 
 
Evaluation Framework for Geological Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide, 1 ENERGY PROCEDIA 
2565, 2571 (2009). 
 94.  See OLDENBURG ET AL., RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 63, at 10; Oldenburg et al., 
Certification Framework, supra note 33, at 456. 
 95.  See, e.g., Lesley K. McAllister, The Enforcement Challenge of Cap-and-Trade 
Regulation, 40 ENVTL. L. 1195, 1196–97 (2010); Edward Vine et al., International Greenhouse 
Gas Trading Programs: A Discussion of Measurement and Accounting Issues, 31 ENERGY POL’Y 
211, 212–13 (2003); Michael W. Wara & David G. Victor, A Realistic Policy on International 
Carbon Offsets 8 (Program on Energy & Sustainable Dev., Working Paper, No. 74, 2008), 
available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22157/WP74_final_final.pdf (detailing the “flaws” in 
the UNFCCC’s Clean Development Mechanism carbon offsets program). 
 96.  See generally IPCC, supra note 34, at 47 (“Recognizing the potential impermanence of 
CO2 stored in the terrestrial biosphere, the UNFCCC accepted the idea that net emissions can 
be reduced through biological sinks, but has imposed complex rules for such accounting.”). 
 97.  SALLY M. BENSON ET AL., MONITORING CARBON DIOXIDE SEQUESTRATION IN 
DEEP GEOLOGIC FORMATIONS FOR INVENTORY VERIFICATION AND CARBON CREDITS 3 
(2006) (prepared for 2006 Society of Petroleum Engineers Annual Technical Conference and 
Exhibition, San Antonio, Texas, September 24–27, 2006), available at http://www.energy. 
utah.gov/government/docs/forum/dec2006/spe102833.pdf. 
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well-managed sequestration sites is “likely to be small in magnitude 
and distant in time.”98 
Significant technical challenges and uncertainties nevertheless 
remain regarding capacities to monitor fugitive emissions and 
reservoir leakage. Technical experts believe that fugitive emissions 
from large-scale industrial systems used to capture, transport, and 
inject CO2 can be estimated with a reasonable degree of accuracy and 
consistent with existing reporting methods.99 Qualitative methods 
exist for estimating leakage rates from reservoirs, and some 
commentators have suggested that they could be supplemented by 
measuring surface fluxes of CO2.
100
 (We are skeptical, given the 
natural variability in background levels of CO2.) Large leaks will be 
readily detectible, and in most cases (such as leakage through 
abandoned wells), they will be rapidly closed.101 A major impediment 
is simply that data on reservoir leakage are extremely limited, as it 
has only just recently become the subject of intensive scientific 
study.102 
In sum, CCS appears to have several advantages over other 
methods of offsetting CO2 emissions, and although it has significant 
technical limitations, the limitations of the potential alternatives are 
likely to be much more severe.103 Moreover, while it is possible that 
the large scale of CCS could backfire, for example, if a large leak in a 
reservoir were to arise and could not be plugged, the probability of 
such an occurrence is believed to be exceedingly slight.104 The relative 
ease of CO2 accounting provides an independent motivation for 
deploying CCS and has important implications for the efficient 
operation of common law liability. 
 
 98.  IPCC, supra note 34, at 46. 
 99.  Id. at 46–47. However, experience with regulation of traditional pollutants in the U.S. 
suggests that accounting for fugitive emissions is often subject to large uncertainties and difficult 
to verify. See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Proper Monitoring Essential to Reducing ‘Fugitive 
Emissions’ Under Leak Detection and Repair Programs, ENFORCEMENT ALERT, Oct. 1999, at 
2–3. 
 100.  See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Carbon Capture and Sequestration: 
Identifying and Managing Risks, 8 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1, 14 (2009). 
 101.  IPCC, supra note 34, at 34; Bachu, supra note 69, at 266. 
 102.  See IPCC, supra note 34, at 371 (“There is insufficient experience in monitoring CCS 
projects to allow conclusions to be drawn on physical leakage rates.”). 
 103.  See generally Lambert Schneider, Assessing the Additionality of CDM Projects: 
Practical Experiences and Lessons Learned, 9 CLIMATE POL’Y 242, 250–51 (2009) (discussing 
“serious weaknesses” in the UNFCCC carbon offsets program’s measure of project 
effectiveness); Wara & Victor, supra note 95, at 8. 
 104.  KUUSKRAA, supra note 64, at 1. 
Adelman_FINAL (Do Not Delete) 2/5/2012 5:58 PM 
20 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 22:1 
II.  THE IMPORTANCE OF EX ANTE REGULATION AND THE 
ABSENCE OF MORAL HAZARD 
Sequestering CO2 underground for approximately 1,000 years 
will push the bounds of governments’ institutional capacities and legal 
frameworks.105 Environmental risks that span long timeframes pose 
particularly challenging problems for both ex ante regulations and ex 
post liability regimes.106 At the most basic level, very few human 
institutions have lifespans in the hundreds of years. Leaders of public 
and private institutions themselves have short time horizons, often 
estimated to be on the order of 10 to 15 years,107 and this bias is 
reinforced by the difficulties of holding decision-makers accountable 
for impacts of decisions that arise decades into the future.108 
The debate over regulation of carbon sequestration recognized 
these temporal challenges early on. As a consequence, proposed 
policies have included complete transfer of liability to the 
government after an active post-closure period for a site, partial 
transfer of long-term liability to the government with companies 
retaining liability up to a legally prescribed limit, as well as 
conventional open-ended corporate liability.109 Yet, while there is 
broad consensus that responsibility for carbon sequestration sites 
should ultimately be transferred to the federal government, many 
questions have been raised about how and when this should occur.110 
There appears to be general agreement that traditional state 
common law doctrines alone cannot effectively address the risks 
posed by carbon sequestration.111 Commentators have singled out 
problems with identifying the specific source of CO2 (which may 
occur if multiple companies sequester CO2 in the same or spatially 
 
 105.  See generally Pruess, supra note 60, at 1684 (noting the difficulty in fostering public 
acceptance of CCS capabilities and drawing analogies to other advanced technologies that pose 
exceedingly low risks of catastrophic failure but are nonetheless not accepted by the public). 
 106.  Robert M. Solow, The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics, 64 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1, 12 (1974). 
 107.  Donald G. Gifford, The Peculiar Challenges Posed by Latent Diseases Resulting from 
Mass Products, 64 MD. L. REV. 613, 637–38 (2005). 
 108.  Id. at 640–42; WILSON ET AL., LIABILITY, supra note 60, at 4. 
 109.  Klass & Wilson, supra note 17, at 158–72. 
 110.  Id. at 172–73; Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 2–3, 14–15. 
 111.  See James J. Dooley et al., Design Considerations for Financing a National Trust To 
Advance the Deployment of Geologic CO2 Storage and Motivate Best Practices, 4 INT’L J. 
GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL 381, 381–82 (2010) (discussing the inability of existing 
frameworks to adequately manage the type of long-term risks posed by CCS); Trabucchi & 
Patton, supra note 26, at 2–3 (noting the inability of current financial risk-management regimes 
to manage CCS risk). 
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overlapping deep brine reservoirs) and the extremely long timescale 
over which leakage of CO2 can occur.
112 Proposed legal responses 
have included enhanced forms of tort liability (such as strict liability 
or joint and several liability), insurance requirements, establishment 
of a federal funding pool, and bonding requirements.113 
Virtually all of the proposed policies are multilayered and 
tailored to specific stages in the lifecycle of a carbon sequestration 
site: active operation and injection, site closure, a 10 to 30 year period 
of post-closure monitoring and oversight, and finally long-term 
stewardship.114 The work of Alexandra Klass and Elizabeth Wilson is 
exemplary in this respect. They have advocated the following liability 
framework:115 First, during active operation and CO2 injection, the 
owner is liable for harm caused by site operations (the liability could 
derive from tort or statutory law), is required to hold adequate 
insurance, and is obliged to pay into a central fund for long-term 
stewardship of the site.116 Second, throughout the closure and post-
closure period, the owner is responsible for site monitoring, 
verification, and any necessary remediation, is held liable for damages 
caused by CO2 releases, and is required to have financial backup in 
the form of bonds or insurance.117 Third, when a site enters long-term 
stewardship, all liabilities and responsibility for site oversight shift to 
the federal government.118 
Resolving the appropriate set of policy instruments for the final 
stage (long-term stewardship) has proven to be particularly 
contentious. CCS industry leaders have singled out long-term liability 
as a major impediment to growth in the carbon sequestration 
industry.119 They claim that the uncertainty associated with long-term 
 
 112.  See Klass & Wilson, supra note 17, at 137, 159; Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 
16. 
 113.  See, e.g., Wilson et al., Assessing, supra note 16, at 4579–80; Trabucchi & Patton, supra 
note 26, at 16–17. 
 114.  See, e.g., Klass & Wilson, supra note 17, at 103–04; Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, 
at 16–17. 
 115.  Klass & Wilson, supra note 17, at 172–78; see also Wilson et al., Assessing, supra note 
16, at 4581. 
 116.  Klass & Wilson, supra note 17, at 174. 
 117.  Id. at 174–75. 
 118.  Id. at 175. 
 119.  CCS ALLIANCE, supra note 15, at 58; INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM’N, 
STORAGE OF CARBON DIOXIDE IN GEOLOGIC STRUCTURES: A LEGAL AND REGULATORY 
GUIDE FOR STATES AND PROVINCES 11 (2007) [hereinafter IOGCC], available at 
http://groundwork.iogcc.org/sites/default/files/2008-CO2-Storage-Legal-and-Regulatory-Guide-
for-States-Full-Report.pdf; Holtkamp, supra note 15, at 12. 
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site liability creates an investment risk that makes CCS a non-
starter.120 On the other side, critics of carbon sequestration and those 
concerned about the moral hazard created by relieving industry of 
liability have strongly opposed frameworks that transfer long-term 
site liability to the government.121 Everyone, irrespective of their view 
about CCS, agrees that long-term site liability must be addressed one 
way or another. 
We argue that little or no tension exists between long-term 
liability, which is presumed to provide incentives for industry to safely 
select and operate sequestration sites, and the environmentally sound 
development of geologic carbon sequestration. The reason, however, 
lies outside the existing debate because ex post tort liability is an 
ineffective deterrent for decisions that have impacts with long periods 
of latency. The conflict consequently disappears because little is lost 
when a company is relieved of long-term liability. Drawing on the 
technical details described above, it becomes clear that ex ante 
regulation is the single most important policy instrument for ensuring 
that latent impacts are factored into siting and operations decisions 
essential to the long-term safety of carbon sequestration sites. 
The discussion that follows will focus on traditional principles of 
economic efficiency. We have framed the issues in this manner for 
two reasons. First, the objections being raised about moral hazard are 
based on conventional economic principles. Second, we take it as a 
given that environmentalists, particularly those who endorse the 
precautionary principle, will be sympathetic to subjecting 
sequestration sites to strict regulation and enhanced liability. The 
novelty of the technology, the potential for irreversible harm, and the 
anticipated scale of operations all reinforce this view.122 Those with a 
conservative economic perspective, by contrast, will be skeptical of 
such interventions. By drawing on economic arguments and 
particularly on a deterrence-based view of tort law,123 we are able to 
 
 120.  CCS ALLIANCE, supra note 15, at 58. 
 121.  See, e.g., GREENPEACE, supra note 1, at 30–31; Trabucchi & Patton, supra note 26, at 
22 (questioning whether “[i]f not held completely financially and legally responsible for future, 
long-term damages, the CCS operator will be less careful in their siting and operating 
decisions”); Livengood, supra note 1. 
 122.  See Andrew Jordan & Timothy O’Riordan, The Precautionary Principle in 
Contemporary Environmental Policy and Politics, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE 
ENVIRONMENT 15–19 (Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel Tickner eds., 1999). One point of 
potential disagreement, which we will address later, could be environmentalists’ objections to 
federal preemption of state laws and programs. See infra Part IV.A. 
 123.  This approach ignores a competing school of theorizing about tort law, corrective 
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ground our case for a mixed system of regulation and liability on 
principles that can overcome these objections. 
A.  Regulation Versus Common Law Liability 
Whether common law tort liability and ex ante environmental 
regulation are substitutes for each other or complementary regimes 
has been hotly contested for decades. For a long time, orthodox 
economic theory considered them to be substitutes, as both are 
designed to correct inefficiencies that derive from environmental 
externalities.124 Economists have since come to appreciate that 
structural features of ex post tort liability and ex ante regulation 
create important differences in how each system operates in practice, 
and that these differences produce opportunities for them to 
complement each other.125 Although still evolving, subsequent 
economic analyses have attempted to provide guidance on how tort 
liability and regulation can be effectively used in tandem.126 
Parallel use of tort liability and regulation, to varying degrees, 
has long been accepted by lawyers and policymakers. For public 
policies ranging from consumer products to industrial emissions, dual 
use of tort liability and regulation is more often the rule than the 
exception.127 Thus, while disagreement exists over many specifics, 
most legal academics recognize that regulatory agencies and common 
law courts play a complementary role in protecting public safety and 
the environment.128 
 
justice, but fortuitously for us, the policy prescriptions of the two schools are aligned for the 
types of “unilateral” harms at issue here and discussed further below. See, e.g., Gary Schwartz, 
Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
1801, 1821 (1997). 
 124.  Charles D. Kolstad et al., Ex Post Liability vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes 
or Complements, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 888, 888 (1990). 
 125.  Id. at 889. 
 126.  See, e.g., Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, The Choice of Instruments for 
Environmental Policy: Liability or Regulation?, in AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: ISSUES IN INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 245, 245–46 
(Timothy Swanson ed., 2002); Paul Calcott & Stephen Hutton, The Choice of a Liability Regime 
When There is a Regulatory Gatekeeper, 51 J. ENVTL. ECON. MGMT. 153, 161–62 (2006); Kolstad 
et al., supra note 124, at 889; Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 
J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 358 (1984). 
 127.  Kolstad et al., supra note 124, at 888–89. 
 128.  Thomas O. McGarity, The Complementary Roles of Common Law Courts and Federal 
Agencies in Producing and Using Policy-Relevant Scientific Information, 37 ENVTL. L. 1027, 
1029 (2007); Patrick W. Schmitz, On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 20 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 371, 371–72 (2000); W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort 
Liability: Social Insurance, Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and 
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Commentators have also recognized that harm-inducing 
activities exist on a continuum that ranges from discrete actions 
involving individualized harm (for example, the risk from chopping 
down a tree in one’s yard) to mass torts involving thousands of 
claimants (for example, harms from air pollution or mass torts such as 
asbestos).129 It is now broadly accepted that the effectiveness of ex 
post tort liability relative to ex ante regulation varies dramatically 
across this spectrum of activities.130 
Propelled in part by the rise of mass torts in the 1980s, 
economists and lawyers began to arrive at a loose consensus on a set 
of structural features that distinguish the relative merits of tort 
liability and regulatory regimes. Steven Shavell, a leading economist 
writing in the area, was among the first to identify a set of governing 
criteria. He identified four primary factors: (1) knowledge 
asymmetries between the private sector and expert regulatory 
agencies, (2) capital constraints of liable corporate defendants, (3) 
likelihood that suits will be brought against liable defendants, and (4) 
administrative costs of implementing regulatory programs versus 
litigating tort suits.131 Shavell went on to describe subsidiary 
conditions that influence the impact of each of these factors, and thus 
whether tort liability is favored over regulation, or vice versa, or 
whether some combination of the two is likely to be most efficient.132 
1.  Shavell Framework 
Several broad patterns emerged from Shavell’s analysis, as well 
as from the work of other commentators.133 The impact of knowledge 
asymmetries, which were assumed to favor private interests due to 
their detailed knowledge of their facilities and processes, has figured 
prominently in this discourse.134 But economists were forced to 
reassess this intuitive assumption when they realized that it could 
 
Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 65–66 (1989); Wendy E. Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating 
Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 695–96 (2007). 
 129.  See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in 
Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210, 212–14 (1996); Shavell, supra note 126, at 357–58. 
 130.  Rabin, supra note 28, at 33. 
 131.  Shavell, supra note 126, at 359–64. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 227–29 (8th ed. 2011); 
Gifford, supra note 107, at 615–18; Rabin, supra note 28, at 28–33; Viscusi, supra note 128, at 
65–66. 
 134.  POSNER, supra note 133, at 86–89; Shavell, supra note 126, at 359; Wagner, supra note 
128, at 697–98. 
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break down for health and safety regulations.135 It became evident 
that many businesses, especially smaller ones, have little knowledge 
about the environmental and human health effects of their 
operations.136 Accordingly, even if corporate officials have superior 
knowledge about reducing polluting emissions, their inability to 
assess the risks to the environment or human health creates a 
countervailing knowledge asymmetry that favors regulation over 
common law liability.137 Knowledge asymmetries therefore often cut 
both ways, and their net effect can be difficult to predict. 
Shavell’s other factors have been less subject to revision. His 
insight about the impact of capital constraints is as vital as ever. The 
basic principle is simple: if a defendant’s capacity to pay is less than 
the damages it could inflict, its capacity to pay will operate as a de 
facto cap on potential liability, and the incentive for due care created 
by tort liability will be inefficiently weak.138 Moreover, because the 
amount of a company’s capital at stake will influence the cost of the 
insurance it purchases, insurance on its own will not offset these 
shortfalls. The effect of capital constraints can also create a perverse 
incentive for corporations to limit their exposure by spinning off the 
parts of their businesses vulnerable to large liabilities (such as mass 
torts) into small, low-capital companies. In general, the efficiency of 
ex post liability will decline the more potential liabilities exceed the 
capital reserves of a defendant.139 
The likelihood that plaintiffs will file suit, if low, also erodes the 
effectiveness of tort liability, as it influences the probability that a 
defendant will be found liable. Two primary factors are important 
here: the degree to which harm is dispersed over a large number of 
people and the potential for substantial delay before a suit is filed.140 
As a general rule, the probability of suit drops as the stake of any 
given person declines or the delay after which harm occurs grows. 
The reasoning is again straightforward. If no plaintiff has a 
significant stake, no one will be motivated to incur the costs of 
bringing suit. Further, insofar as class actions are available to 
overcome the low stakes of individual plaintiffs, experience suggests 
 
 135.  Shavell, supra note 126, at 369–70. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. at 359; see Viscusi, supra note 128, at 75–77 (observing that the tort system does not 
“undertake any fundamental risk-related research”). 
 138.  Gifford, supra note 107, at 617; Shavell, supra note 126, at 360–61. 
 139.  Shavell, supra note 126, at 360–61. 
 140.  Id. at 363. 
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that organizing a large group of plaintiffs can impede litigation, 
particularly if they have heterogeneous interests.141 Delay is 
problematic for plaintiffs because the evidence necessary to 
demonstrate who caused the harm and whether their actions were 
negligent will typically be more difficult to obtain.142 Corporate 
executives will also discount the liability posed by distant suits based 
on the likelihood of suit and other factors discussed further below, 
thereby undermining the incentives provided by tort liability.143 
Administrative costs of tort liability and regulatory regimes are 
driven by different factors. The administrative costs of regulatory 
regimes for CCS would be high because of the complexity of technical 
rulemaking and because regulatory oversight would apply to all sites, 
regardless of whether or not they are operating safely.144 Conversely, 
tort regimes’ costs scale with the number of claimants and the 
complexity of the harms; thus, the smaller the number of potential 
claimants and the simpler the technical issues, the more tort liability is 
favored.145 Roughly speaking, the balance will tip toward regulation 
with larger numbers of claimants and higher complexity because the 
cost savings of individualized rulings, which are triggered only when 
harm actually arises, are offset by the efficiency gained from generally 
applicable regulations. 
Commentators have also identified other factors affecting 
administrative costs. These include the uncertainty of legal standards, 
which typically favors regulation;146 the confounding of harms 
attributable to background risks from other sources, such as exposure 
to background levels of cancer-causing chemicals;147 and the 
challenges of clearly defining the potential class of victims, 
particularly in the case of mass tort actions where indirect impacts can 
become important.148 
The literature in this area is voluminous and still growing. Many 
variations on Shavell’s initial framework have emerged that advocate 
 
 141.  Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risks, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 
1027, 1048–49 (1990). 
 142.  Gifford, supra note 107, at 615–17; Rabin, supra note 28, at 32. 
 143.  Gifford, supra note 107, at 640–43. 
 144.  Shavell, supra note 126, at 364; Viscusi, supra note 128, at 72–74. 
 145.  Shavell, supra note 126, at 368–69; Viscusi, supra note 128, at 74. 
 146.  Kolstad et al., supra note 124, at 889; Viscusi, supra note 128, at 82–83. 
 147.  See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Relation Between Civil Liability and Environmental 
Regulation: An Analytical Overview, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 379, 380–81 (2002); Rabin, supra note 
28, at 29. 
 148.  Abraham, supra note 147, at 382; Rabin, supra note 28, at 29–30. 
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different mixes of policies or identify circumstances in which specific 
forms of liability are favored over others or are superior to traditional 
regulation. Paul Calcott and Stephen Hutton, for example, have 
suggested that if regulatory oversight is error-free, then negligence-
based liability combined with regulation is more efficient than strict 
liability.149 In a more recent analysis, Rouillon asserts that the use of 
regulation and tort liability “is always optimal” and that regulatory 
standards “should be designed in a less stringent manner when used 
jointly” with tort liability.150 
Much of this work is based on econometric studies subject to 
limiting assumptions that qualify the inferences one can draw from 
them. Accordingly, beyond the broad framework developed by 
Shavell, large uncertainties remain about how liability and regulatory 
regimes can be optimally combined. 
2.  Private Versus Public Discounting of Latent Environmental 
Harms 
Economists commonly describe the principal objectives of a tort 
system as preventing accidents, compensating victims, and minimizing 
administrative costs.151 These objectives are frustrated when there is a 
long delay between the distribution of a product, harmful exposure, 
or decision triggering the risk of harm and the occurrence of harm: 
When harmful exposure has occurred decades earlier, it is virtually 
impossible to achieve any meaningful preventive effect through the 
allocation of civil liability. There are insurmountable problems of 
discontinuity in enterprise management, unforeseeability of the 
parameters of risk, doubts about the contributory fault of others, 
speculativeness in discounting to present value . . . .152 
Put simply, the latency of harm can negate the incentives 
provided by a tort system. Incentives are further eroded when latent 
harms affect multiple victims and individual suits cannot be 
consolidated in a single class action suit.153 In two such cases—harm to 
individuals living downwind of the Nevada nuclear weapons test site 
 
 149.  Calcott & Hutton, supra note 126, at 153, 161–62. 
 150.  Sébastien Rouillon, Safety Regulation vs. Liability with Heterogeneous Probabilities of 
Suit, 28 INT’L REV. L. ECON. 133, 133–34 (2008). 
 151.  Gifford, supra note 107, at 619–20; Rabin, supra note 28, at 43. 
 152.  Rabin, supra note 28, at 43. 
 153.  Abraham, supra note 147, at 380–81; Gifford, supra note 107, at 633; Rabin, supra note 
28, at 40; Rosenberg, supra note 129, at 217–18. 
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and victims of Agent Orange during the Vietnam war—the result was 
“staggering litigation costs and years of delay.”154 
The diminished incentives for corporate actors are particularly 
acute. As one commentator has noted, the “typical corporate 
decisionmaker . . . likely does not give much weight to the prospect of 
a liability judgment many decades into the future.”155 This myopia is 
driven in large part by the difficulty of holding decision-makers 
accountable for latent risks,156 and by the short investment time 
horizon of senior managers that is reinforced by the arguably even 
shorter time horizon of shareholders in evaluating the profitability of 
firms.157 As a consequence, even economically efficient decisions for 
future cost avoidance will lose against options with immediate effect, 
as executives will have nothing to show for the former.158 Long latency 
periods can also produce perverse incentives for companies to 
operate with relative impunity and then go out of business, or 
alternatively to structure themselves into small, low-cap companies to 
limit their ultimate liability.159 
A perfectly functioning market would preclude such divergences 
between a corporate actor’s near-term interests and the long-term 
interests of the company, but this presumes that accurate information 
is available on latent risks, which often is not the case because risks 
may be inchoate (the problem of “unknown unknowns”) until new 
information or understanding become available or harms actually 
arise.160 Even without such impediments, deferral of liability is the 
next best thing to not having to pay at all; to make this concrete, $1 
million of liability 40 years in the future has a net present value of just 
 
 154.  Rabin, supra note 28, at 45. 
 155.  Gifford, supra note 107, at 636. 
 156.  See Shavell, supra note 126, at 363. 
 157.  See Gifford, supra note 107, at 640–42 (quoting Steven S. Cherensky, Shareholders, 
Managers, and Corporate R&D Spending: An Agency Cost Model, 10 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 299, 328 (1994)); Gillette & Krier, supra note 141, at 1040–41 
(explaining managers’ tendency to discount probabilities of long-term risk in favor of more 
tangible short-term gains). 
 158.  Gifford, supra note 107, at 640–42. 
 159.  See, e.g., Al H. Ringleb & Steven N. Wiggins, Liability and Large Scale, Long-Term 
Hazards, 98 J. POL. ECON. 574, 591–93 (1990). 
 160.  See Gifford, supra note 107, at 644–47. One could also argue that it is unfair to 
shareholders to make polluters pay for delayed liability, as it has the potential to “impose[] the 
cost of remediation on those with the misfortune of having acquired stock from those who 
benefitted from the pollution.” Id. at 642–43 (quoting Richard B. Belzer, Discounting Across 
Generations: Necessary, Not Suspect, 20 RISK ANALYSIS 779, 788 (2000)). 
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$452,890.161 Routine economic accounting of latent harm on its own 
causes the incentives provided by common law liability to be (perhaps 
rationally) discounted substantially. 
The factors outlined above, among others, have led legal 
commentators to conclude that products or activities that produce 
harms with long latency periods negate the preventative effect of 
liability regimes and shift the primary goal of legal liability “to 
devising a low cost, equitable method of compensating victims.”162 
Under these circumstances, no-fault liability schemes (such as the 
Price-Anderson Act for nuclear power reactors163 and the Black Lung 
compensation system164) have a comparative advantage over 
traditional tort liability, but policymakers must be careful in designing 
them, as they too can be undermined by litigation.165 The failure of 
common law regimes to deter latent harms also places a high 
premium on effective ex ante regulation, which is left as the primary 
means of deterring such harms.166 
More fundamental analytical problems arise when harms are 
latent for timescales of more than a few decades. Questions of 
intergenerational equity are important for timescales of this 
magnitude, and conventional methods of economic discounting 
become “speculative” and hotly contested.167 Liberal economists like 
Nicholas Stern maintain that social discount rates for 
 
 161.  See id. at 638 (using a discount rate of two percent). 
 162.  Rabin, supra note 28, at 43; see Gifford, supra note 107, at 685–87. 
 163.  Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006). 
 164.  Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901–945 (2006). 
 165.  Gifford, supra note 107, at 687–89 (noting the difficulties under no-fault liability 
schemes in proving that a victim’s injuries were caused by the designated compensable event); 
Rabin, supra note 28, at 49 (describing criticisms of no-fault environmental liability schemes as 
being potentially overinclusive, underinclusive, inefficient, and inequitable). 
 166.  See Gifford, supra note 107, at 697. 
 167.  See NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 
31–32 (4th prtg. 2008) (explaining why conventional discount rates should be rejected when 
intergeneration equity is at stake); Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Intertemporal Equity, Discounting, 
and Economic Efficiency, in CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE 125, 130–34 (1996) (discussing the methodological issues and controversies 
that surround debates over discount rates for analyzing the economics of climate change policies 
and risks); Partha Dasgupta, Commentary: The Stern Review’s Economics of Climate Change, 
199 NAT’L INST. ECON. REV. 4, 5–6 (2007) (describing different methods and rationales for 
setting discount rates); William D. Nordhaus, A Review of the Stern Review on the Economics 
of Climate Change, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 686, 689–701 (2007) (examining and critiquing 
arguments for different discount rates when long-term harms associated with climate change are 
at stake); Solow, supra note 106, at 8–10 (describing the different methods used in setting 
discount rates and the normative issues raised). 
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intergenerational impacts should be close to zero, as opposed to the 
market rates of seven percent advocated by more conservative 
economists.168 The important point for our purposes is that were the 
United States to adopt the Stern approach, private and public 
discount rates for the long-term risks associated with carbon 
sequestration would diverge dramatically. This divergence would 
undermine a liability regime because higher private discount rates 
would result in a societally inefficient (that is, low) level of deterrence 
for such long-term risks. 
B.  Implications for the Debate over Long-Term Liability 
The preceding discussion describes the limits of tort liability as a 
legal mechanism for mitigating risky behavior and compensating 
victims. With respect to carbon sequestration, the Achilles’ heel of 
tort liability is latency, which stands to be a significant, if not a 
dominant, characteristic of the risks associated with releases of CO2 
or brine. However, unlike cases involving mass torts or many forms of 
environmental harms, the impediments posed by latency are less 
likely to derive from evidentiary gaps or scientific complexity. 
Particularly for site-selection decisions, neither information about the 
sequestered CO2 nor about causation will diminish over time. Nor, as 
we argue further below, should capital limits or the dispersed nature 
of the harms pose significant barriers. The limited effectiveness of 
liability will instead be driven by the near-term focus of corporate 
decision-making and potentially divergent private and public discount 
rates. 
A perhaps Pyrrhic benefit of corporate myopia in this context is 
that it averts concerns that transferring responsibility for long-term 
liabilities from carbon sequestration sites to the government will 
compromise incentives that companies would otherwise have to safely 
select and operate their sites. Despite the abundance of attention that 
this putative conflict has received, the institutional limits of corporate 
accountability and the human psychology of latent harms negate the 
effectiveness of ex post liability regimes as an efficient deterrent for 
long-term risks. 
Only government regulation has the capacity to target risks with 
long latency periods.169 Yet, one must acknowledge that regulators are 
also subject to temporal myopia and political pressures that erode 
 
 168.  Nordhaus, supra note 167, at 689–90, 692. 
 169.  See Gifford, supra note 107, at 697; Rabin, supra note 28, at 4. 
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their willingness or ability to promulgate regulations that adequately 
consider long-term risks.170 In contrast to most private entities, 
however, countervailing pressures from powerful organizations and 
individuals committed to environmental protection exist within and 
outside government.171 Differences also exist between the public and 
private sectors in their respective institutional norms, ranging from 
normative mandates to the appropriate discount rate, discussed 
above. Accordingly, and notwithstanding its own limitations, the 
government is institutionally better placed than the private sector to 
factor long-term risks into its decision-making processes.172 
Contrary to concerns raised in debates over legal liability for 
releases of CO2 from sequestration sites, neither fears about 
unbounded long-term liability nor concerns about limiting it should 
be impediments to the safe deployment of geologic carbon 
sequestration. Instead, concerns about ensuring that carbon 
sequestrations sites are selected and operated with due care ought to 
be focused foremost on promulgating effective performance-based 
regulations. 
III.  THE APPROPRIATE FORMS AND LIMITED ROLE OF TORT 
LIABILITY 
This section evaluates the circumstances under which traditional 
tort liability may provide meaningful deterrence against poor site 
selection and operation, as well as compensate victims when releases 
of brine or CO2 do occur.
173 The analysis in the preceding section on 
the limitations of tort liability bounds the arguments made here: tort 
liability will play a secondary role to regulation. Our objective is 
briefly to analyze the tort doctrines available and specifically to 
determine whether enhanced forms of tort liability can offer an 
efficient means of mitigating near-term risks from carbon 
sequestration sites. Anticipating the arguments of opponents to 
enhanced liability, we begin by showing that there is little reason for 
 
 170.  Solow, supra note 106, at 12. 
 171.  See, e.g., Maureen L. Cropper, et al., The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation: A 
Statistical Analysis of EPA Decision Making, 100 J. POL. ECON. 175, 194–95 (1992) (finding that 
interventions by environmental groups had a greater impact than those by industry groups); 
Marisa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rulemaking Process: Who Participates? Whose 
Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 262–63 (1998) (describing the 
influence of environmental public interest groups on agency rulemaking). 
 172.  See, e.g., Gillette & Krier, supra note 141, at 1039–42, 1067–70. 
 173.  We will not address potential conflicts and claims between landowners over impacts on 
their utilization of pore space caused by injection of CO2 from adjoining properties. 
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concern that CO2 sequestration sites will be subject to the pathologies 
critics commonly associated with enhanced liability for environmental 
harms. 
A.  Misplaced Fears About Liability for Releases from Sequestration 
Sites 
The legacies of Superfund, which governs liability for cleaning up 
contaminated property, and the more recent experience with a 
somewhat novel extension of tort liability to oil companies for the 
release of a gasoline additive (MTBE) from gas stations have 
overshadowed policy debates about CCS. We will distinguish the 
circumstances of each from the distinctive conditions relevant to 
carbon sequestration. It is relatively straightforward to show that the 
underlying bases for critics’ concerns simply do not apply to carbon 
sequestration. With this case made, we then turn to the substantive 
analysis of the appropriate role for tort liability. 
1.  The Long Shadow of Superfund Liability 
Decades of experience have shown that timely remediation of 
contaminated sites and compensation for damages to plaintiffs from 
environmental releases is enormously difficult to achieve. Superfund, 
which retroactively established strict, joint and several liability for 
releases of hazardous compounds into the environment, is viewed by 
its critics as exemplary of the pathologies endemic to enhanced tort 
liability for environmental harms.174 Yet, passage of Superfund was 
motivated by the salutary belief that “imposing a broad net of liability 
with a minimal causation requirement, limited defenses, and joint and 
several responsibility would encourage expeditious settlement of 
cases” and site cleanups.175 Thirty years after it became law, debate 
continues over the costs of implementing Superfund and its record of 
remediating contaminated sites. 
Critics of Superfund believe, for a variety of reasons, that its 
objectives have been met only sporadically. Drawing on decades of 
data, they assert that cleanup of many sites was delayed by years and 
that disputes over liability and cost allocation led to an enormous 
amount of costly litigation.176 Some estimates suggest that the total 
 
 174.  See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, The Limitation of Legal Institutions for Addressing 
Environmental Risks, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 107–08 (1991) (describing the institutional 
limitations of Superfund litigation). 
 175.  Id. at 106. 
 176.  CCS ALLIANCE, supra note 15, at 20; see also James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, 
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public and private transaction costs associated with Superfund 
liability amount to between 24 and 44% of the direct costs of 
cleanup.177 These commentators maintain that the sheer magnitude of 
the liability (hundreds of millions of dollars at the largest sites) and 
the moral indignation of defendants at being held retroactively 
liable—jointly and severally no less—for decades-old releases caused 
an industry backlash that fueled Superfund litigation for years.178 
Even accepting these criticisms, which are hotly contested,179 one 
must be careful in drawing inferences from experience under 
Superfund. This is particularly true for releases from sequestration 
sites because the conditions that complicated implementation of 
Superfund are largely absent. First, the imposition of enhanced 
liability would be prospective, thereby avoiding a primary source of 
the perceived unfairness of Superfund. Second, dramatic differences 
in the relative contributions of different parties are less likely to arise 
given the infrastructure costs and benefits of scale for sequestering 
CO2, as most if not all sequestration sites will be large and thus of 
similar scale.180 Third, and perhaps most important, releases from 
sequestration reservoirs will involve only two substances, brine or 
CO2, and the amount of CO2 sequestered will be closely monitored 
and independently verified.181 Both of these factors will greatly 
simplify liability suits and, if joint and several liability were to apply, 
contribution actions between defendants. Fourth, because the 
damages caused by leakage of CO2 are projected to be modest and 
information about relative contributions difficult to contest,182 quick 
settlements should be the norm. Each of these factors militates 
against the pathologies that critics associate with Superfund. 
Critics also raise the specter that imposing enhanced liability 
could cause corporations to employ strategic responses to mitigate 
their liability. Such second-order strategic responses often involve 
 
How Costly is “Clean”? An Analysis of the Benefits and Costs of Superfund Site Remediations, 
18 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 1, 22–24 (1999) (detailing the purported inefficiencies of site 
cleanups under Superfund); Judy & Probst, supra note 21, at 236–38. 
 177.  Menell, supra note 174, at 108; cf. Judy & Probst, supra note 21, at 236–38 (discussing a 
broader range of statistics that suggest transaction costs vary by site over the course of its 
cleanup, and that they declined substantially over the course of Superfund history). 
 178.  Menell, supra note 174, at 107. 
 179.  Margaret Kriz, The Superfund Saga, NAT’L J., Oct. 21, 1995, at 2592. 
 180.  IEA, supra note 2, at 15, 29–30, 38–39; see supra Part I.B. 
 181.  See Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control Program for 
Carbon Dioxide Geologic Sequestration Wells, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,230, 77,236 (Dec. 10, 2010). 
 182.  See supra Part I.B. 
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companies spinning-off or outsourcing high-risk activities to smaller 
entities as a means of effectively capping or circumventing liability.183 
The limited resources and diminished exposure of smaller companies 
can in turn cause them to underinvest in risk-management capabilities 
and technical resources, effectively nullifying the expected benefits of 
strict liability. More troubling, the net effect of imposing strict liability 
could be negative, with environmental releases actually increasing 
under a strict liability regime,184 although these claims are also 
contested.185 
In any case, the economics of geologic sequestration ought to 
preclude such corporate gerrymandering. The benefits of scale raise 
the costs of limiting liability in this manner while the modest risks 
lower the liabilities at stake; both disfavor this type of strategic 
behavior. Although we expect it will be unnecessary, policymakers 
(and ultimately judges) may nevertheless want to protect against such 
tactics. Borrowing from Superfund, this could be achieved by 
extending liability to upstream generators of CO2, which would give 
them an additional incentive to select reputable companies and to 
demand transparent accounting of sequestration operations. 
2.  Misreading the Implications of the MTBE Controversy 
Tort liability is controversial in many settings, and liability for 
environmental harm beyond Superfund has also inspired industry 
cynicism and scorn. The most recent high-visibility incident involved 
the release of the gasoline additive methyl-tertiary butyl ether 
(MTBE) from poorly maintained underground storage tanks into 
drinking water aquifers.186 MTBE has been frequently singled out as a 
cautionary story that illustrates the dangers of tort liability for 
geologic sequestration of CO2.
187 MTBE was certified by the EPA in 
the early 1990s to mitigate vehicle emissions and subsequently used 
 
 183.  Anna Alberini & David H. Austin, Strict Liability as a Deterrent in Toxic Waste 
Management: Empirical Evidence from Accident and Spill Data, 38 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 
20, 21 (1999). 
 184.  Id. at 43–44. 
 185.  Bruce A. Larson, Environmental Policy Based on Strict Liability: Implications of 
Uncertainty and Bankruptcy, 72 LAND ECON. 33, 35, 41 (1996). 
 186.  See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, MTBE AND THE 
NEED FOR EFFECTIVE TORT LAW 2–3 (2005), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/ 
articles/MTBE_506.pdf. 
 187.  See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Moore, The Potential Law of On-Shore Geologic Sequestration of 
CO2 Captured from Coal-Fired Power Plants, 28 ENERGY L.J. 443, 482–83 (2007). 
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widely throughout the United States.188 Unfortunately, by the late 
1990s MTBE was discovered in many public water supplies and 
identified as a suspected human carcinogen.189 Much class-action 
litigation ensued.190 
The lawsuits were not, however, brought against the gas stations 
from which MTBE had leaked. Instead, the plaintiffs’ attorneys 
targeted large oil companies, which were far fewer in number and had 
the capital to cover the remediation costs and damages.191 The 
plaintiffs claimed that the oil companies had negligently distributed 
gasoline containing MTBE with prior knowledge of its environmental 
risks.192 To the surprise of many critics, the plaintiffs’ strategy was 
successful despite evidentiary challenges in establishing liability 
(MTBE spread widely and rapidly underground). Those challenges 
were overcome by imposing proportional liability based on each 
company’s market share.193 Needless to say, this did not sit well with 
the industry, which viewed the targeting of oil companies as unfair 
because they were not directly responsible for the releases of MTBE 
and, perhaps more infuriatingly, because the EPA had sanctioned the 
use of MTBE in gasoline.194 
Many legal commentators view the MTBE saga in a very 
different and much rosier light. They maintain that the plaintiffs’ 
success demonstrates the flexibility of tort law and its capacity to 
correct regulatory failures.195 According to this perspective, courts 
were justified in extending liability to the oil companies for two 
reasons. First, the oil companies had both sufficient financial 
resources and the capacity to broadly spread the costs of the liability, 
whereas the victims had neither.196 Second, extending liability to the 
 
 188.  MCGARITY, supra note 186, at 4; see also Trevor Graves, Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether 
(MTBE): A Certification Problem, 17 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 187, 188 (2003). 
 189.  Michael J. Moran et al., MTBE and Gasoline Hydrocarbons in Groundwater of the 
United States, 43 GROUND WATER 615, 616, 618–19 (2005). 
 190.  See, e.g., Richard O. Faulk & John S. Gray, Reunion in Salem: Updating the MTBE 
Saga, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,667, 10,668 (2006). 
 191.  See MCGARITY, supra note 186, at 11–13. 
 192.  See id. at 2. 
 193.  Moore, supra note 187, at 482–83; Greg B. Kail, Persistence Pays Off in MTBE Tussle, 
J. AWWA, Feb. 2006, at 77–78 (describing how defective product claims paved the way to large 
settlements against oil companies). 
 194.  See Joseph F. Speelman, The MTBE Controversy: Defending Mass Tort Claims, 69 
DEF. COUNS. J. 35, 35–37 (2002). 
 195.  MCGARITY, supra note 186, at 11–13; see also Klass & Wilson, supra note 17, at 143–
44. 
 196.  MCGARITY, supra note 186, at 11–13. 
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oil companies created an incentive for them to ensure that the small 
entities selling their products are safely operated and adequately 
insured. 
Whatever one’s view of the MTBE litigation, leakage of brine or 
CO2 from geologic sequestration sites is unlikely to trigger a similar 
controversy. Perhaps most importantly, it is doubtful that carbon 
sequestration sites will be either owned by small entities or cause 
economically ruinous damage. As we have shown, the technical 
complexities, regulatory demands, infrastructure costs, and scale of 
individual sites all cut against an industry structure mirroring that of 
the oil industry (that is, large corporate producers and refiners 
upstream and small, low-capital businesses at the retail level).197 The 
potential harms will also be less widespread and costly. 
Finally, given the technical limits of site characterization methods 
and the recognition among experts that some degree of leakage is 
unavoidable,198 regulatory gaps will be inescapable and should be 
anticipated upfront. Subjecting companies, up- or downstream, to tort 
liability under these circumstances hardly seems unfair, particularly 
given the financial resources they are likely to have, the availability of 
insurance coverage, and the capacity of large companies operating in 
a national-level (if not international) industry to spread costs. 
B.  Comparative Advantages of Different Forms of Tort Liability 
CO2 releases from sequestration sites could be subject to any one 
of the three basic forms of tort liability: negligence, nuisance, or 
trespass. Each doctrine has a particular orientation. Negligence, as 
the term implies, addresses negligent acts of defendants who owe a 
duty of care to a plaintiff. Nuisance centers on actions by a defendant 
that interfere with a plaintiff’s “use and enjoyment” of her land, while 
trespass is triggered when a defendant causes a physical intrusion on a 
plaintiff’s land. The operator of a carbon sequestration site, for 
example, could negligently cause CO2 to leak into an overlying 
aquifer on neighboring properties and severely degrade the water 
quality, thereby implicating all three tort doctrines. 
 
 197.  See IEA, supra note 2, at 15, 29–30, 38–39; IPCC, supra note 34, at 63 (describing the 
importance of economies of scale to reducing the costs of CCS); supra Part I.B. 
 198.  See supra Part I.A. 
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1.  Negligence: Due Care and Causation 
A defendant’s conduct will be deemed negligent if it causes harm 
to a plaintiff and does not meet the applicable duty of care 
established by statute or professional norms.199 The relevant conduct 
for our purposes encompasses the selection, operation, and closure of 
a sequestration site. Courts apply several subsidiary tests for 
reasonableness of care, including whether the harm was foreseeable 
and, if so, whether the precautions taken were a “reasonable” 
response to the risks at stake; defendants need not eliminate risk 
altogether.200 In complex cases involving harm to human health and 
the environment, causation often becomes a limiting element for 
plaintiffs because it is difficult to prove.201 A countervailing virtue of 
negligence is that it can be used by plaintiffs who are injured 
personally by leakage of CO2 but whose land is unaffected (for 
example, users of public water systems). 
The most significant risk associated with releases of brine or CO2 
from sequestration sites—contamination of drinking water aquifers—
is likely to make it difficult for plaintiffs to show that a defendant 
failed to exercise “reasonable care” and to establish causation. The 
standard of due care for site selection, which is the single most 
important decision for site performance,202 would have to be defined 
at a general level despite the heterogeneity of sites and the tradeoffs 
in site characterization methods caused by inherent technical and 
practical limits discussed further below.203 This analysis would require 
courts to balance the potential for site characterization to increase 
risks (site characterization typically requires drilling additional wells 
into a reservoir) against the benefits of additional information. 
Similarly, operational decisions will often be highly dependent on 
technically complex site-specific circumstances that may involve 
difficult tradeoffs. 
Establishing negligence will be further complicated if multiple 
defendants inject CO2 into the same brine reservoir but no single 
defendant injects more than a small fraction of the total. Absent 
 
 199.  See DOBBS, TORTS, supra note 91, at 269–70 (describing the elements of a claim for 
negligence). 
 200.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965); JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., 
THE TORTS PROCESS 175–78 (5th ed. 1999). 
 201.  Klass & Wilson, supra note 17, at 137. 
 202.  See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 203.  See Nicot & Duncan, supra note 60, at 17–18. 
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application of enhanced liability (proportional or strict),204 a plaintiff 
would have difficulty establishing causation, as no single defendant 
may have contributed “substantially” to the resulting harm.205 
2.  Relative Strengths of Trespass and Nuisance 
The doctrines of trespass and nuisance require showing that a 
defendant’s activity has encroached on a plaintiff’s property rights. 
Trespass involves an intentional, reckless, or negligent act that 
interferes with a plaintiff’s “possession” of her land.206 Intent may be 
established if a trespass is “substantially certain” to follow from a 
defendant’s action, regardless of whether the trespass was 
intentional.207 For CCS, the migration of CO2 and brine is 
“substantially certain” to occur (estimates of subsurface storage 
capacity are in fact premised upon occurrence of significant 
migration) and will be the subject of extensive modeling at each 
site.208 The intentionality requirement for trespass should therefore be 
straightforward for plaintiffs to establish. 
Nuisance involves an interference with a plaintiff’s “use and 
enjoyment” of her land.209 The primary difference between trespass 
and nuisance is that trespass requires a direct physical invasion of a 
plaintiff’s property, whereas nuisance does not. For example, 
intrusion of CO2 into the subsurface of a plaintiff’s property could 
constitute a trespass,210 and if the intrusion interferes with the use of a 
plaintiff’s property (for example, by degrading water quality in a 
well), it could also constitute a nuisance.211 In general, neither doctrine 
requires that the defendant have a duty to use due care or that the 
defendant have acted negligently. Thus, whereas negligence involves 
liability-forming conduct, trespass and nuisance involve liability-
producing conditions. 
 
 204.  See Abraham, supra note 147, at 387. 
 205.  Id. at 381, 386–87. 
 206.  JAMES A. HENDERSON ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 380–81 (6th ed. 2003). 
 207.  Id. at 379. 
 208.  See supra Part I.B. 
 209.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821D–828 (describing the elements of private 
nuisance). 
 210.  See, e.g., Vill. of DePue v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., Nos. 08-cv-1272, 08-cv-1273, 2009 WL 
1841582, at *9 (C.D. Ill. June 25, 2009) (finding that merely establishing a subsurface intrusion is 
sufficient to establish trespass). 
 211.  See Owen L. Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass”: A Man’s Subsurface Is Not His Castle, 
49 WASHBURN L.J. 247, 271 (2010) (describing cases of subsurface intrusion in which direct 
harm leads to a cause of nuisance). 
Adelman_FINAL (Do Not Delete) 2/5/2012 5:58 PM 
Fall 2011] CCS LIABILITY & REGULATION 39 
The standards that apply under trespass and nuisance differ in 
several important respects. The standard for nuisance turns on 
whether a defendant has caused an unreasonable interference with a 
plaintiff’s foreseeable use and enjoyment of his property.212 Similar to 
negligence, courts balance the utility of a defendant’s conduct against 
the harms to a plaintiff in determining whether a nuisance exists, and 
this risk-benefit balancing is central to a court’s judgment.213 Other 
factors may also enter into the analysis, such as the duration of the 
interference; a nuisance will likely be found for persistent 
interferences even if the degree of interference is minor.214 Actions for 
nuisance, public or private, would cover direct damages to property 
from releases of brine or CO2.
215 
Trespass turns on whether a defendant’s actions have caused a 
substance to intrude onto a plaintiff’s land.216 However, when a 
trespass occurs in the subsurface of a plaintiff’s property, trespass 
often becomes a special case of the nuisance doctrine, as many 
jurisdictions require that a subsurface trespass cause some kind of 
physical damage or interference with the use of the property in 
question.217 Commentators have also suggested that the technical 
challenges may make it difficult for plaintiffs to establish proof of 
subsurface trespass.218 Accordingly, absent proof of some form of 
interference with a foreseeable use of a plaintiff’s property, trespass 
claims will be foreclosed. 
As applied to releases of CO2 from sequestration sites, nuisance 
and trespass have two important advantages for plaintiffs over 
negligence. First, because neither trespass nor nuisance claims 
stemming from migration of CO2 or brine will be premised on 
negligent conduct, the fact that a defendant was meeting the 
conditions of a valid state or federal permit is largely irrelevant. The 
existence of a valid permit can enter a court’s nuisance analysis only 
 
 212.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821D–828. 
 213.  DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 765–71 (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter DOBBS, 
REMEDIES] (discussing the balancing of benefits and harms in nuisance cases). 
 214.  See id. at 767 (explaining how the degree of hardship is taken into account during the 
balancing test). 
 215.  It is uncertain, however, whether owners of properties overlying a sequestration 
reservoir could succeed on a claim of “stigma” and seek compensation for diminished property 
value. Moore, supra note 187, at 478–79. But see Klass & Wilson, supra note 17, at 144–45 
(suggesting that claims for stigma may be viable). 
 216.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 158–59. 
 217.  Anderson, supra note 211, at 270–72. 
 218.  Moore, supra note 187, at 478. 
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indirectly when it balances the utility of a defendant’s conduct against 
the harm to the plaintiff.219 By contrast, while compliance with a 
permit is not determinative in a negligence case, it is directly relevant 
to determining whether a defendant exercised due care.220 Second, in 
suits that arise long after the relevant conduct has occurred or 
decisions have been made, trespass and nuisance claims will be less 
impacted than negligence claims because they focus on current 
conditions rather than a defendant’s earlier conduct.  
Application of the two doctrines will be more complicated for 
releases of brine. While the benefits of bringing a nuisance claim for 
brine intrusion are identical to those for CO2, it is uncertain whether a 
claim of trespass will be viable. The reason for this is that either there 
will be no physical trespass of brine from a defendant’s property, or 
insofar as there is a trespass, it will be impossible to trace.221 In the 
latter case, the limited case law that exists suggests that trespass 
claims will be precluded unless a plaintiff can demonstrate direct and 
measurable damages to his property.222 
C.  The Merits of Enhanced Tort Liability 
Three supplementary tort doctrines—strict liability, proportional 
liability, and joint and several liability—have the potential to mitigate 
the challenges of establishing liability for harmful releases from 
sequestration sites. Strict liability eliminates the need to demonstrate 
negligence, proportional liability relaxes the standard for 
demonstrating causation under a theory of negligence, and joint and 
several liability makes defendants individually and collectively liable 
 
 219.  See, e.g., DOBBS, REMEDIES, supra note 213, at 769–70 (noting that “[w]hen the 
defendant’s conduct has violated a statute, it is possible that the legislature has already weighed 
the competing interests and has reflected its judgment in the statue,” and that “[i]n such a case 
the court may be willing to discount its own assessment of public interest”). This contrasts with 
liability under negligence, which is treated as “per se” when a plaintiff demonstrates that a 
defendant was in violation of a regulatory standard, that the harm caused is the type of harm the 
governing statute was designed to mitigate, and that the plaintiff is within the class of people the 
statute was established to protect. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL HARM §14 (Proposed Final Draft 2005). 
 220.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14. 
 221.  Recall that release of brine will be driven by elevated pressures and very little bulk 
movement of brine is projected to occur. See supra Part I.B. 
 222.  See Boudreaux v. Jefferson Island Storage, 255 F.3d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that the migration of salt water injected into a mile-deep reservoir under plaintiff’s property was 
not an actionable trespass, although plaintiff could obtain compensation for measurable 
damages if he had had any); Raymond v. Union Tex. Petroleum Corp., 697 F. Supp. 270, 273–75 
(E.D. La. 1988) (same); see also Anderson, supra note 211, at 270–72 (discussing these and other 
cases addressing subsurface trespass). 
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for the harms at issue regardless of their respective contributions. 
These doctrines increase both the likelihood that a plaintiff will 
prevail and the potential liability of defendants, and in so doing, 
enhance the incentives for defendants to mitigate risks. 
1.  The Basic Forms of Enhanced Liability Relevant to 
Environmental Harms 
For environmental harms, strict liability is triggered when a 
defendant owns or operates a facility from which a harmful substance 
was released regardless of whether the defendant was negligent.223 
Strict liability is most commonly applied when products or activities 
are deemed to be “abnormally dangerous.”224 Courts designate 
activities as abnormally dangerous if they create a significant risk of 
physical harm.225 Economists justify this condition on the ground that 
strict liability should apply to activities posing risks that cannot be 
mitigated through due care.226 Strict liability thus complements 
negligence; it applies when a standard of due care is insufficient to 
mitigate the risks posed by an activity.227 Under this theory, strict 
liability provides incentives for more radical forms of risk mitigation, 
such as relocating or downscaling a dangerous activity.228 It promotes 
these changes by increasing the effective liability, costs of capital, and 
insurance coverage.229 
While strict liability is generally disfavored in the United States, 
cases involving environmental contamination are among the few 
exceptions to this general rule.230 In New Jersey, for example, several 
cases involving environmental contamination have held defendants 
strictly liable when they were unaware that the materials released 
from their facilities contained toxic chemicals.231 Because no cases 
have been filed to date that allege liability for environmental releases 
 
 223.  See Alexandra B. Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation: The Impact of CERCLA on 
Common Law Strict Liability Environmental Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 903, 907–08 
(2004) (discussing an early example of strict liability applied in an environmental context). 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520. 
 226.  POSNER, supra note 133, at 227–28. 
 227.  Id. at 228. 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Id. 
 230.  Klass, supra note 223, at 904. 
 231.  See, e.g., N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983) 
(applying hindsight analysis); Prospect Corp. v. Singer Co., 569 A.2d 908, 911 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1989). 
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of CO2 from injection operations (primarily the use of CO2 to 
enhance oil recovery), it is unclear whether geologic sequestration of 
CO2 will trigger strict liability.
232 
Proportional liability is a variant of negligence that is applied 
even more sparingly than strict liability.233 It was designed to address 
circumstances in which contributions to a source or type of harm are 
indivisible (for example, a toxic chemical spill with multiple, 
undifferentiated contributors).234 The doctrine lowers the effective 
standard for causation (a plaintiff merely has to demonstrate that a 
defendant contributed to the source of harm), and ultimate liability is 
based on a defendant’s relative contribution to an otherwise 
indivisible source of harm.235 Unless defendants are able to produce 
direct evidence of their relative contribution, courts use surrogate 
metrics, such as market share or volumetric contribution, to calculate 
the proportion of the damages for which a defendant will be liable.236 
Courts typically limit the application of proportional liability to 
circumstances in which defendants have contributed to the same or 
very similar sources of harm (for example, all sold the same product 
suffering from the same defect).237 This requirement should not 
preclude claims based on proportional liability for releases from 
sequestration sites, as potential defendants will all be injecting the 
same substance and causing identical types of harm. 
Joint and several liability increases the potential scope of liability 
for all defendants by making them collectively and individually 
responsible for all of the harms associated with an environmental 
release to which they have contributed.238 This approach enables 
plaintiffs to seek compensation from a single, wealthy defendant and 
thereby to reduce litigation costs and delays in receiving 
compensation. Equity and fairness are factored into the doctrine by 
allowing defendants to seek compensation from responsible parties 
who were not sued by the plaintiff.239 State-level statutory and 
 
 232.  See Elizabeth J. Wilson & Mark A. de Figueiredo, Geologic Carbon Dioxide 
Sequestration: An Analysis of Subsurface Property Law, 36 ENVTL L. REP. 10,114, 10,123 (2006). 
 233.  See Mark A. Geistfeld, The Doctrinal Unity of Alternative Liability and Market-Share 
Liability, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 447, 448–51 (2006). 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Allen Rostron, Beyond Market Share Liability: A Theory of Proportional Share 
Liability for Nonfungible Products, 52 UCLA L. REV. 151, 153 (2004). 
 238.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIABILITY § E18. 
 239.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIABILITY § 22. 
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common law reforms have created a patchwork of approaches to joint 
and several liability. Although twenty or so states have retained the 
doctrine—largely by failing to legislate restrictions—it is rarely 
applied in practice,240 and many states have passed laws that greatly 
limit its applicability.241 Accordingly, absent specific state or federal 
legislation, joint and several liability is unlikely to be available. 
2.  Subjecting Sequestration Sites to Enhanced Liability: 
Unilateral Harms 
The standard justifications for strict liability do not apply to CO2 
sequestration sites. Strict liability is conventionally justified as a gap 
filler when abnormally dangerous activities cannot be mitigated 
through the exercise of due care.242 Yet, one of our central arguments 
is that releases of either brine or CO2 from sequestration sites are 
unlikely to pose large risks, from which one can infer that 
sequestration of CO2 is not an abnormally hazardous activity that 
warrants imposition of strict liability. The unique characteristics of 
geologic sequestration of CO2 also limit opportunities to downscale or 
fundamentally change injection processes. Indeed, to the extent that 
sequestration of CO2 is effective, it would occur on an extraordinarily 
large scale,243 and it is precisely this enormous capacity to mitigate 
CO2 emissions that makes CCS an attractive option. Economies of 
scale and the vastness of saline reservoirs further cut against reducing 
the size of individual sequestration sites,244 as it would limit the rate at 
which CO2 could be injected and dramatically reduce the amount that 
could be sequestered. 
These justifications overlook an often underappreciated 
alternative factor—the unilateral nature of the risks. In this context, a 
unilateral harm would be one solely within the control of site 
operators.245 The concept of unilateral harm clearly applies to CO2 
sequestration because injured parties would be passive receptors of 
the harms from leakage of CO2 or brine. Subjecting sequestration 
sites to strict liability under these circumstances is economically 
 
 240.  DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1085–87 (2000). 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  POSNER, supra note 133, at 227–29. 
 243.  Sam Holloway, Underground Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide—A Viable Greenhouse 
Gas Mitigation Option, 30 ENERGY 2318, 2318 (2003). 
 244.  See IEA, supra note 2, at 15, 29–30, 38–39; IPCC, supra note 34, at 63 (describing the 
importance of economies of scale to reducing the costs of CCS); supra Part I.B. 
 245.  STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 6–8 (1987). 
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efficient because site operators—through siting, operational, and 
closure decisions—are the only parties capable of mitigating risks, 
and are thus by definition the lowest-cost risk avoiders.246 
This argument does not necessarily rule out negligence, which 
can produce economically efficient outcomes for unilateral risks if 
courts set due care at the socially optimal level.247 However, resolving 
the level of due care is likely to be challenging for courts given the 
limits of careful site characterization to detect certain leakage 
pathways,248 the diminishing returns of increasing the resolution of site 
assessments (as well as monitoring), and the risks associated with site 
characterization methods (requiring drilling additional test wells).249 
In short, persistent technical uncertainties, which will vary markedly 
between sites, will cloud efforts by courts to establish a clear standard 
of due care. Where such uncertainty prevails, economic principles 
favor strict liability over negligence.250 
The relative simplicity of establishing strict liability will also 
lower litigation costs relative to a negligence regime. Lowering the 
cost of litigation and enhancing the likelihood of prevailing through 
strict liability would also increase the number of suits, thereby 
potentially increasing aggregate administrative costs.251 However, this 
inference ignores the potential for settlement rates to increase, which 
seems quite likely in this context. Recall that the volumes of CO2 
sequestered will be precisely tracked,252 and this information would 
suffice to decisively establish causation under strict liability and to 
provide a basis for allocating liability between defendants. 
Collectively, these considerations suggest that the net impact on 
administrative costs will likely favor strict liability over negligence or 
will at worst be a wash. 
Liability, even for modest risks, still has the potential to impact 
site-selection decisions.253 Rough estimates of sequestration capacities 
 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  OLDENBURG ET AL., RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 63, at 10. 
 249.  See supra Part I.B. 
 250.  POSNER, supra note 133, at 227–29. 
 251.  Id. at 229. The extent to which the costs would diverge would depend on the degree to 
which accidents are caused by negligence as opposed to being unavoidable; the more that they 
are unavoidable, the greater the divergence. Id. 
 252.  See supra Part I.C. 
 253.  See POSNER, supra note 133, at 229 (explaining that a basic premise of strict liability is 
that, particularly for new industries, it provides efficient incentives for risk producers to locate 
their operations in regions that avoid the most significant risks). 
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in the United States suggest that, at least in the near-term, many high-
quality sites will be available.254 This surplus should continue during 
the early period of CCS deployment when experience is being gained 
rapidly. The availability of multiple potential sites suggests that 
liability, particularly strict liability, can be used to encourage facility 
owners to locate sequestration sites in low-risk regions. If geologic 
sequestration of CO2 is successful, cost-premiums will increase for 
higher-quality sites, but by that time scientists may have a better 
understanding of harmful releases and perhaps improved methods for 
mitigating them, and this information could be integrated into formal 
siting and site-operation regulations. Tort liability is therefore likely 
to be most effective during the earlier stages of CCS deployment. 
The applicability of proportional liability, which requires a 
showing of negligence, will be limited to circumstances under which 
either (1) subsurface CO2 plumes overlap and are a source of leakage, 
or (2) zones of elevated pressure around injections wells interact such 
that reservoir pressures at a point of leakage (such as an abandoned 
well) are driven by them collectively. As we have seen, the latter case 
is both much more probable, given the huge projected areas of 
elevated pressure, and is likely to arise much earlier.255 Although 
plaintiffs rarely succeed in convincing courts to invoke proportional 
liability, the detailed information that will be available on injection 
volumes of CO2 and the identical nature of the contributions from 
injection sites—each injecting only CO2 and all driving pressure 
increases—make this an ideal case for proportional liability. Insofar 
as negligence is viewed as the appropriate legal regime, proportional 
liability will be indispensable.  
The case for imposing joint and several liability is by far the 
weakest. Unlike many of the contaminated sites covered by 
Superfund, the number of potential defendants should be tractable 
given the scale of the operations, the potential for defendants to be 
judgment-proof (whether through bankruptcy or low capitalization) 
will be low, and the magnitude of the likely impacts will be modest. 
Under these circumstances, the potential for over-deterrence, which 
naturally arises when the scope of liability is expanded beyond what a 
given defendant is responsible for, is likely to outweigh the benefits to 
 
 254.  Orr, supra note 35, at 1656. Even low-end estimates find capacities that far exceed 
potential needs over the next few decades. Benson & Surles, supra note 32, at 1796; Jordan K. 
Eccles et al., Physical and Economic Potential of Geological CO2 Storage in Saline Aquifers, 43 
ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 1962, 1967–69 (2009). 
 255.  See supra Part I.B. 
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plaintiffs. Neither the number of potential defendants nor the 
challenges of identifying them is likely to limit plaintiffs’ ability to file 
a suit. 
An important caveat must be kept in mind: like all other forms of 
ex post liability, the incentives created by enhanced forms of liability 
will depend on the timing of CO2 or brine leakage. For reasons 
discussed above,256 if releases largely occur after a significant latency 
period (decades after active injection of CO2 ceases), enhanced 
liability will have only very modest deterrence value. Insofar as 
enhanced liability targets relatively near-term risks, it can be a useful 
complement to traditional regulatory requirements. The degree to 
which this holds may be mitigated by the uncertainties about the 
timing of site leakage, but rigorous regulatory standards will be 
necessary regardless of the liability regime put in place. 
D.  The Appropriate Role of Tort Liability 
Commentators have focused significant attention on how 
enhanced liability could be applied to sequestration sites. Alexandra 
Klass and Elizabeth Wilson have suggested that application of strict 
liability will vary from state to state.257 They predict that strict liability 
would not be applied in states like Texas, where CO2 is used routinely 
in enhanced oil recovery, but could be applied in Eastern or 
Midwestern states where it remains a novelty.258 John Moore has 
expressed concern about scenarios in which leakage of CO2 poses 
much greater risks than currently predicted.259 He raises the specter of 
a mass-tort scenario in which “owners and operators of . . . facilities 
could potentially be liable to a large number of claimants . . . within 
tens or hundreds of kilometers of injection sites.”260 His concern rests 
on the potential breadth of harm and the low barrier to suit created 
by strict liability.261 
Surprisingly, debate over the applicability of enhanced liability 
has tended to avoid normative theories such as those discussed above. 
Moore’s concern that large numbers of plaintiffs could potentially file 
 
 256.  See supra Part I.A. 
 257.  See Klass & Wilson, supra note 17, at 141–43 (arguing that if sequestration of CO2 is 
considered a “matter of common usage” or “appropriate” use of the land, strict liability is 
unlikely to apply). 
 258.  Id. at 142–43. 
 259.  Moore, supra note 187, at 483. 
 260.  Id. 
 261.  Id. 
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suit comes closest, but the scenario itself is highly speculative, and he 
does not ground his argument on economic principles. The CCS 
industry’s hostility to enhanced liability is also based on speculative 
scenarios of debilitating liability.262 In the opposing camp, Klass and 
Wilson have asserted that neither strict liability nor joint and several 
liability should be rejected out of hand, and articulated mild support 
for a specialized law establishing enhanced liability for releases of 
CO2 from sequestration sites.
263 Citing some of the principles 
discussed above, they base these claims on the belief that enhanced 
liability would enable plaintiffs injured by a CO2 leak to obtain 
funding for remediation actions and compensation for damages.264 
These theoretical gaps have been compounded by the abstract 
treatment of the risks at stake. The timing of potential harms is, as we 
have seen, central to the effectiveness of tort liability, and timing 
turns on the nature of a release and the technical capacities to detect 
it. Subsurface monitoring can identify leakage from a sequestration 
reservoir long before impacts on risk receptors arise, and thus before 
legally cognizable harms exist.265 Surface or near-subsurface 
monitoring can detect direct impacts on drinking water quality, but 
scientists believe that such releases would not be detectable “at a 
well-designed storage site in the foreseeable future” (with only very 
small and slow leakage points).266 Moreover, extended periods of 
latency (beyond the operational phase of a site) could foreclose most 
avenues for altering site operation—apart from the drastic option of 
removing stored CO2—and limit options to near-surface remediation 
or natural attenuation. In any event, latency would also greatly 
diminish the deterrence value of tort liability. 
The best cases from a liability standpoint will involve relatively 
near-term releases (during site operation or closure) with readily 
detectable impacts. The only realistic candidates will involve releases 
of brine or CO2 through significant transmissive faults or abandoned 
 
 262.  See CCS ALLIANCE, supra note 15, at 20–21, 58 (discussing the potential applicability 
of CERCLA to CO2 leaks); Trabucchi et al., supra note 13, at 388–89. 
 263.  Klass & Wilson, supra note 17, at 132. 
 264.  Id. 
 265.  R.A. Chadwick et al., Review of Monitoring Issues and Technologies Associated with 
the Long-Term Underground Storage of Carbon Dioxide, 313 GEOLOGIC SOC’Y LONDON 257, 
271–74 (2009). Further, significant uncertainties will exist about whether actual harm will 
materialize—making it difficult to seek preemptive injunctive relief—unless harm were defined 
as any movement of CO2 above a storage reservoir, which would subject site operators to many 
unnecessary challenges and potential holdups. 
 266.  Id. at 271. 
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wells.267 These types of releases have been singled out by numerous 
scientists as the most important source of risk from sequestration 
sites, but in the case of faults, they can also be the most difficult to 
identify during site characterization.268 Both the early timing and 
elusiveness of these risks play to the strengths of ex post liability,269 
and thus make them ideal test cases for comparing the relative virtues 
of different forms of liability. 
1.  The Net Effect of Imposing Enhanced Liability 
The case for enhanced liability is strong but requires a nuanced 
understanding of the circumstances under which harmful leakage 
from a sequestration site is likely to occur. The current debate largely 
sidesteps the factual details and economic grounds on which liability 
regimes are conventionally evaluated. As discussed above, we believe 
that the single most important factor favoring enhanced liability is the 
unilateral nature of the harms; site operators are the least-cost 
avoiders because only they have the capacity to prevent or mitigate 
harm. However, the practical value of enhanced liability cannot be 
assessed without considering the overlapping standards of 
conventional tort doctrines of nuisance and trespass. Recall that while 
neither nuisance nor trespass claims will require a showing of 
negligence, trespass is essentially a strict liability doctrine, whereas 
nuisance requires the court to balance the utilities of the opposing 
parties. In either case, the net effect of imposing strict liability cannot 
be evaluated without considering the applicability of these other tort 
doctrines. 
Relative to negligence, strict liability increases the likelihood that 
plaintiffs will prevail and thus file suit. To varying degrees, the same 
can be said of trespass and nuisance. The applicability of these 
doctrines will turn on plaintiffs showing that a defendant has 
interfered with a property right—a requirement which large releases 
of CO2 or brine into a drinking water aquifer could meet. Depending 
on the magnitude of the impacts, the balancing of the utilities 
 
 267.  See supra Part I.A. 
 268.  See supra Part I.B. 
 269.  Sally M. Benson & Robert Hepple, Prospects for Early Detection and Options for 
Remediation of Leakage from CO2 Storage Projects, in 2 CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE FOR 
STORAGE IN DEEP GEOLOGIC FORMATIONS—RESULTS FROM THE CO2 CAPTURE PROJECT 
1189, 1195–96 (Sally M. Benson ed., 2005). These characteristics also highlight the importance of 
site monitoring, operational decisions (for example, reducing or halting CO2 injection), and 
corrective actions (such as closing a subsurface fault). Id. 
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required under nuisance could also favor plaintiffs, given that 
reasonable measures should be available to avoid or mitigate harms 
(for example, reduce injection rates, plug a leaking well, or treat 
affected water sources).270 Under these circumstances, the application 
of strict liability and trespass will track each other, while the 
balancing required under nuisance adds a layer of analytical 
uncertainty. 
These doctrinal similarities suggest that for near-term releases 
involving a single defendant, strict liability would not increase the 
plaintiffs’ odds of success over trespass claims and may not be 
markedly superior to nuisance. One must nevertheless be careful to 
consider the distinct conditions under which releases of CO2 and 
brine can occur. For a single injector, the source of a CO2 release will 
be easily traceable and will necessarily involve a trespass, implying 
that all three doctrines will apply. Releases of brine, however, will be 
triggered by elevated pressures, which could extend miles from the 
injection well.271 At these distances, no plausible basis will exist for 
claiming that brine from a defendant’s property has trespassed onto a 
plaintiff’s property because actual physical movement of brine is 
projected to occur on the order of feet, not miles.272 This result implies 
that plaintiffs will rarely be able to bring a claim for trespass. 
The rough parity in deterrence provided by strict liability and 
standard forms of liability will be broken further when multiple 
parties sequester CO2 in the same deep saline reservoir. Recent 
scientific modeling has found that zones of elevated pressure around 
injection wells are likely to interact within years to decades, at which 
point it will be impossible to separate the contributions from each 
well to pressure buildup in a reservoir.273 Moreover, although the 
specific timing will depend on the distances between injection wells, 
model results suggest that wells spaced tens of kilometers apart will 
interact within a few years.274 By contrast, the model results were just 
 
 270.  Id. at 1195–1200. 
 271.  See supra Part I.B. 
 272.  Zhou et al., supra note 22, at 509 (finding that lateral movement of brine would be 
very modest over the first 50 years of site operation). 
 273.  Birkholzer & Zhou, supra note 22, at 750 (simulation predicting that interaction 
between wells spaced 30 km apart would arise within a year and that reservoir-wide pressure 
effects were indivisible within 50 years). 
 274.  Id. 
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the opposite for CO2 plumes, which were projected to remain 
relatively localized and thus unlikely to overlap.275 
To date, it has been the potential indivisibility of CO2 plumes 
from different injection wells that has often animated calls for 
applying enhanced forms of liability to sequestration sites. Strict 
liability would circumvent the problem by defining causation broadly 
(as contributing to CO2 injections into a reservoir). Proportional 
liability would redefine causation in a similar manner, but it would 
also require plaintiffs to demonstrate that each defendant acted 
negligently. Under this approach, joint and several liability would 
reduce litigation costs and delays by enabling plaintiffs to sue a single 
party for the total damages.276 Both strict liability and strict, joint and 
several liability would increase the likelihood of plaintiffs successfully 
bringing suit relative to proportional liability. 
The net benefits of the different doctrines will clearly differ 
depending on whether a release involves CO2 or brine. Harmful 
releases of CO2 will be subject to strict liability under the doctrine of 
trespass irrespective of whether enhanced forms of liability are 
available because CO2 plumes from different injection wells are 
unlikely to overlap. Subjecting these types of releases to enhanced 
liability is therefore unlikely to have any effect. On the other hand, 
pressure-driven releases of brine will rarely entail a trespass, and 
where multiple parties are involved, the pressure effects driving a 
release will not be attributable to a single injector. This result suggests 
that accountability for such releases will typically be foreclosed 
absent enhanced liability. Put differently, the motivation for applying 
strict liability to sequestration sites ought to rest solely on the 
potential risks associated with releases of brine. 
2.  Negligence Versus Strict Liability 
A critical factor in deciding between negligence and strict 
liability is the likelihood that courts will establish an efficient level of 
due care. In general, to the extent that determining the level of due 
care is technically complex and site-specific, strict liability will be 
favored over negligence or proportional liability.277 Strict liability in 
essence transfers judgments about due care from the courts to 
 
 275.  See Nicot, Fresh-Water, supra note 22, at 589–90; KALUNKA ET AL., supra note 20, at 
4–5; Zhou et al., supra note 22, at 503–04. 
 276.  See supra Part III.C.1. 
 277.  See supra Part III.C.2. 
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defendants, who are presumed to possess the information and 
requisite knowledge to evaluate risks and benefits. We have already 
argued that the limits of geological data and the heterogeneity of site 
characteristics favor imposition of strict liability.278 But these factors 
are most relevant to ex ante site selection, which differs in substance 
and information content from operational decisions. 
This distinction is important because the incentives provided by 
liability are quite different at the site selection and operational phases 
of a sequestration project. The differences can be appreciated by 
considering them separately. Focusing first on site selection, there 
would be no added value in imposing strict liability on the best class 
of sites, as such sites would already be in optimal locations. By 
contrast, applying strict liability to low-quality sites could deter 
companies from selecting them based on attributes other than safety. 
Accordingly, to the extent that sites can be ranked (even roughly) 
upfront, efficiency could be enhanced by tiering the form of liability 
based upon the ranking of a sequestration site: negligence for the best 
sites, and strict liability for lower-quality sites. 
In practice, site selection will not be determinative of risk, 
although it is generally viewed as a site operator’s single most 
important choice regarding safety. Operational decisions (such as 
monitoring systems and protocols) are important because they can 
facilitate identification of releases and mitigate their impacts. This 
will be true of even the best sites because certain key variables (for 
example, reservoir permeability) cannot be resolved at the site 
selection stage.279 Further, at the operational stage the exercise of due 
care is less affected by the information gaps that exist when a site is 
selected, as a substantial amount of additional information is 
generated once a site is running.280 
This qualitative analysis suggests that negligence can provide an 
efficient level of deterrence against operational risks, assuming of 
course that courts can set the level of due care efficiently. If true, this 
would also support a tiered system of liability. For the best sites, 
liability would be directed solely at operational risks, for which 
negligence may suffice. For lower-quality sites, strict liability would 
 
 278.  See supra Part III.C.2. 
 279.  See OLDENBURG ET AL., RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 63, at 10; Oldenburg et al., 
Certification Framework, supra note 33, at 446. Further, because the geologic characteristics of 
better sites will make monitoring more effective, the quality of information will be higher at the 
best sites, which will in turn elevate the importance of operational decisions. Id. 
 280.  See supra Part I.A. 
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promote proper site selection, but this decision also implicates 
operational decisions because the nature and magnitude of a site’s 
risks will be a function of both site selection and operational 
decisions, as will the quality of the information available (better sites 
will typically be easier to monitor). Accordingly, because operational 
decisions are more complicated for poorer sites, it makes sense to 
subject them to strict liability as well. 
It is worth noting that the relative value of liability may increase 
for operational decisions. Information asymmetries between site 
operators and regulators are likely to increase because significant new 
information is generated during the CO2 injection process.
281 Yet, 
resource constraints will limit the EPA’s capacity to scrutinize this 
new data and knowledge,282 much of which will be relevant to 
assessing risks.283 The information generated will also be highly site-
specific, thereby limiting the benefits of scale that can enhance the 
relative efficiency of regulatory programs.284 For the types of near-
term risks implicated here, the likely emergence of information 
asymmetries reinforces the potential for tort liability to complement 
traditional regulatory regimes based on uniform minimum standards. 
Synthesizing our findings leads to the following conclusions. 
First, absent legislative intervention, releases of CO2 will be subject to 
strict liability through trespass. Second, some form of enhanced 
liability (strict or proportional) should apply to releases of brine to 
overcome the indivisibility problems that could otherwise preclude 
plaintiffs from successfully bringing claims under either negligence or 
nuisance. Third, the deterrence value of liability—whatever its 
form—will be limited to the relatively near-term risks associated with 
releases through faults or abandoned wells. These findings reveal that 
the current debate over regulation of sequestration sites ignores the 
primary source of risk—brine intrusion—and misapprehends the legal 
 
 281.  Chadwick et al., supra note 265, at 272–73. The injection process itself will provide 
much more reliable information about the characteristics of the reservoir (permeability, cap 
rock, pore space) than imaging methods can provide, and site operators will iteratively update 
and refine their models in response to this continuous flow of information. Id. 
 282.  See, e.g., Richard Webster, Federal Environmental Enforcement: Is Less More?, 18 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 314–18 (2006) (noting that resource constraints are a common 
phenomenon in all EPA programmatic areas). 
 283.  Chadwick et al., supra note 265, at 272–73. 
 284.  The effectiveness of site monitoring, for example, will vary between sites. In general, 
the same properties that make reservoirs good for sequestration (for example, permeability and 
porosity) also enable more effective monitoring. See id. at 259, 272–73; BENSON ET AL., supra 
note 97, at 9. 
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issues in both the short and the long term. In particular, the debate 
has overstated the potential role of tort liability as a policy instrument 
for promoting safe sequestration of CO2 and the importance of 
liability in mitigating long-term risks. 
The preceding discussion provides a theoretically grounded 
model for enabling liability to complement regulations more 
effectively. We have shown that a strong case exists for extending 
strict liability to all sites for releases of CO2 and brine: the harms are 
unilateral, and it will be challenging for courts to set an efficient level 
of due care. However, the political opposition to subjecting 
sequestration sites to strict liability is likely to preclude this approach, 
as is the judicial trend against imposing strict liability. Conventional 
principles of economic efficiency also support selective extension of 
strict liability if courts can set efficient levels of care for operational 
decisions, which the higher-quality information available for low-risk 
sites ought to facilitate. Under this two-tiered framework, strict 
liability would apply to lower-quality sites (such as sites with poor cap 
rock or valuable overlying aquifers), while negligence or proportional 
liability or both would apply to high-quality sites for releases of brine 
(trespass will cover harm from releases of CO2 from all sites). 
This system would supplement a traditional ex ante regulatory 
regime, which is itself vulnerable to substantial informational gaps 
and asymmetries, by providing an added (albeit limited) incentive for 
site owners to select higher-quality sequestration sites. This pragmatic 
approach attempts to balance the twin virtues of efficiency and 
political viability without sacrificing the primary benefits of the 
former in favor of the latter. Nevertheless, because this approach 
would require new legislation (perhaps an amendment to the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (SDWA)285), we should also assess alternative 
purely regulatory approaches. As described further below, we expect 
political opposition to rigorous oversight to be substantial, whatever 
form it takes. We propose this hybrid approach both because it is 
normatively grounded on conservative economic principles and 
because we believe it has political virtues that could mitigate industry 
opposition. 
 
 285.  Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-26 (2006). 
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IV.  A TWO-TIERED SYSTEM OF LIABILITY AND MINIMUM 
PERFORMANCE-BASED STANDARDS 
In this final section, we further describe our hybrid policy 
framework for geologic sequestration of CO2 that exploits the 
complementary strengths of common law liability and traditional 
regulation. The framework uses enhanced liability in conjunction with 
regulatory standards and data: sites below a specified safety ranking 
would be subject to strict liability and possibly heightened regulatory 
requirements (such as additional site characterization requirements). 
This selective use of strict liability is designed to provide an added 
incentive for site owners to select low-risk sequestration sites, 
particularly during the early phases of CCS deployment. As it stands, 
the EPA’s Underground Injection Control (UIC) program is legally 
limited to setting minimum standards, which will not provide an 
incentive, particularly in the near term, for site operators to select the 
highest-quality sites.286 
Consistent with the preceding discussion, we believe that 
uncertainties about the technical, economic, and political viability of 
CCS are far more significant than the speculative concerns about 
long-term liability and alleged large-scale risks associated with CO2 
sequestration. However, the only way to begin the process of 
resolving these uncertainties about CCS viability is to construct full-
scale CCS facilities, including sequestration sites. These efforts are 
being impeded, in part, by concerns about legal liability and risks to 
the environment and human health. Programs designed to promote 
deployment of CCS are unlikely to be successful without effective 
regulatory and liability policies, and ideally should be coordinated 
with them. The integration of regulatory and deployment policies is 
discussed in the final subsection below. 
A.  The Current Legal Environment: Federal Versus State Regulation 
None of the existing federal laws, on its own, provides a 
comprehensive regulatory framework for carbon sequestration. The 
EPA currently regulates sequestration of CO2 through its UIC 
program under the SDWA.287 The UIC program was designed to 
regulate traditional threats to ground and surface water from toxic 
 
 286.  Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control Program for Carbon 
Dioxide Geologic Sequestration Wells, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,230, 77,235 (Dec. 10, 2010). 
 287.  Id. 
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contaminants,288 but the EPA’s authority to regulate underground 
injection under the SDWA is limited to setting minimum standards.289 
Thus, while the SDWA addresses the primary sources of risk (impacts 
on groundwater from CO2 or brine), to the extent that high-quality 
sites are more costly to purchase or operate (for example, because of 
deeper reservoirs), the law does not provide any incentives for 
companies to go beyond the EPA’s minimum standards. 
The limitations of other statutes are even greater. If CO2 were 
categorized as a “hazardous waste,” its disposal could be controlled 
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),290 
which imposes enhanced liability for environmental releases and a 
panoply of stringent regulations covering the “handling, storage, and 
disposal” of hazardous wastes.291 However, RCRA is directed almost 
exclusively at surface disposal of wastes.292 Similarly, sequestration 
sites will be regulated under the Clean Air Act, but such regulations 
would apply only to releases of CO2 directly into the atmosphere.
293 
Finally, Superfund could be amended to cover releases of CO2 or 
brine into the environment,294 but it imposes an elaborate procedural 
architecture that is unlikely to be needed for sequestration sites295 and, 
of equal importance, would incite strong industry opposition given 
private sector aversion to Superfund. 
Several states have passed, or are working to pass, sequestration-
specific legislation, including limits on tort liability, rules for 
determining pore-space ownership, and laws covering the siting and 
operation of carbon sequestration sites.296 These trends raise the 
 
 288.  Id. 
 289.  Id. at 77,241 (describing the new regulations as establishing “minimum federal 
requirements” for geologic sequestration of CO2). 
 290.  42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992 (2006); Klass & Wilson, supra note 17, at 126–28. 
 291.  Klass & Wilson, supra note 17, at 125. 
 292.  See id. (explaining duties under RCRA, which all relate to surface waste disposal). 
 293.  Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases: Injection and Geologic Sequestration of 
Carbon Dioxide, 75 Fed. Reg. 75,060, 75,062–63 (Dec. 1, 2010) (setting reporting and 
monitoring requirements under the Clean Air Act). 
 294.  Klass & Wilson, supra note 17, at 130–32 (explaining why Superfund would not cover 
CO2 releases from sequestration sites); MARIANNE HORINKO, THE GLOBAL ENV’T & TECH. 
FOUND. & AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, CARBON CAPTURE AND SEQUESTRATION: LEGAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES AHEAD 4 (2007), available at 
http://www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs/Attachment%20%236.pdf. 
 295.  ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND 
POLICY 263–69 (3d ed. 2000) (describing the structure of CERCLA and procedures that govern 
cleanups). 
 296.  Melisa F. Pollak & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Regulating Geologic Sequestration in the 
United States: Early Rules Take Divergent Approaches, 43 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 3035, 3035 
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prospect that the regulatory standards and potential tort liability 
applicable to geologic sequestration of CO2 will become an interstate 
patchwork that could undermine effective deployment of CCS. 
Industry representatives and commentators have already raised 
concerns that differences in legal regimes—rather than technical 
merits—may become a significant determinant of where companies 
choose to locate CO2 sequestration sites.
297 One could also question 
whether state agencies and courts, particularly in states lacking 
experience with these types of activities (for example, with CO2-based 
enhanced oil recovery), will have the resources or expertise needed to 
oversee the operation of sequestration sites. 
Reasonable arguments can be made both for and against uniform 
federal legislation that would preempt state laws.298 Regulation of 
impacts on drinking water under the SDWA, existing federal 
regulation of waste disposal and environmental releases of hazardous 
substances, and federal efforts to regulate CO2 emissions each 
provide solid precedent for federal-level legislation. Yet states retain 
regulatory authority over oil and gas development, which shares 
many regulatory issues with geologic sequestration of CO2 and is 
directly implicated when CO2 is used to enhance oil recovery. 
Further, carbon sequestration is likely to occur in only a small 
number of states (including Illinois, Ohio, and Texas) over the next 
few decades,299 which ought to diminish immediate concerns about the 
emergence of inconsistent and competing state-level legal regimes. 
On balance we believe that the current regime of minimum 
performance-based standards under the SDWA, which place a floor 
on potential “races to the bottom” between states in setting 
 
(2009); Thomas J. Russial, CCS: Legal and Regulatory Framework—10 Year Progress Report 
71–72 (Nov. 2010), http://southwestcarbonpartnership.org/_Resources/PDF/Final%20Verion_ 
Nov_7_CCS%20Legal%20and%20Regulatory%20Framework%20Progress%20Report.pdf. 
 297.  CCS ALLIANCE, supra note 15, at 58; Christopher Bidlack, Regulating the Inevitable: 
Understanding the Legal Consequences of and Providing for the Regulation of the Geologic 
Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide, 30 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 199, 217–18 (2010); 
Wilson & Figueiredo, supra note 232, at 10,123. 
 298.  An enormous amount of literature exists on federalism as it relates to environmental 
regulation and common law liability, as well as on federalism issues generally. In this article, we 
cannot address all of the questions and likely objections to our preference for federal-level 
regulation, and we doubt that it is ultimately a question that can be decided definitively either 
way. See generally David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case 
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1801–13 
(2008) (describing the competing theories in the federalism debate). 
 299.  See Eccles et al., supra note 254, at 1968 (indicating that carbon sequestration is likely 
to be economically viable only for reservoirs in a relatively small number of states). 
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regulatory standards for sequestration sites, ought to be retained. The 
anti-regulatory bias of several of the states promoting CCS 
(Mississippi, Texas, and Wyoming, among others)300 suggests that such 
downward pressures are not merely speculative. These considerations 
are reinforced by the regional scale at which oversight of deep saline 
reservoirs should occur and by the fact that many reservoirs cross 
state lines,301 both of which raise the potential for interstate conflict. 
The critical importance of site selection to mitigating potential risks 
underscores the need for establishing a consistent set of minimum 
standards across the country to ensure that sites are selected for their 
merits rather than the regulatory environment. 
Additionally, we see little downside to regulatory uniformity in 
the form of minimum performance standards given the limited range 
of risks involved. Notwithstanding the variability of site conditions, 
the basic attributes of the risks (threats to groundwater quality) are 
unlikely to vary markedly between well-selected sites.302 Similarly, the 
economies of scale that can be gained by centralizing regulation in the 
federal government, the perceived novelty of sequestering CO2 deep 
underground, and the global nature of climate change all favor a 
federal regulatory scheme.303 While we do not view the case for 
preemptive minimum federal standards as beyond dispute, numerous 
factors weigh in favor of it and few, if any, strongly against. 
Minimum federal standards will not, however, ensure that the 
best sites are selected; instead, they will only exclude higher-risk sites 
from being developed. Yet, the surplus of available sites, persistent 
technical uncertainties, and political volatility surrounding geologic 
sequestration of CO2 all suggest that incentives for developing the 
lowest-risk sites during the early phases of CCS deployment ought to 
be a priority. The surplus of potential sites implies that there will be 
ample opportunity for early entrants to select low-risk sites. Similarly, 
although the absolute risks are projected to be low, the technical 
uncertainties leave open the potential for unanticipated releases to 
occur in an unforgiving political environment that is hypersensitive to 
any incidents involving environmental releases, regardless of their 
 
 300.  See generally David M. Konisky, Regulator Attitudes and the Environmental Race to the 
Bottom Argument, 18 J. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH & THEORY 321, 327 (2008) 
(identifying Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas as states with the weakest enforcement 
of environmental regulations). 
 301.  DOE ATLAS, supra note 30, at 27. 
 302.  See supra Part I.B. 
 303.  Adelman & Engel, supra note 298, at 1801–06. 
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impacts. Minimum federal standards, unless uncharacteristically risk 
averse, will not foreclose environmental releases that could trigger a 
major public backlash against CCS. 
Tiered tort liability has the capacity to augment federal 
standards, particularly during the early stages of CCS deployment, by 
providing an added incentive for operators to select high-quality sites. 
While a tiered framework could be implemented through a regulatory 
regime, this approach would entail broader federal preemption of 
state regulations and, as discussed further in the next subsection, 
would be subject to the limitations—particularly information 
asymmetries—of a pure regulatory approach. It would also require 
legislative action extending the existing regulatory system under the 
SDWA, which, in the current political environment in Washington, 
D.C., is likely to provoke strong opposition in Congress.304 
Our hybrid regime is less intrusive, although it would also 
require new legislation to establish a program for ranking 
sequestration sites, as well as rules governing liability for 
environmental releases from them. This hybrid approach has three 
primary virtues over a pure regulatory regime: First, the ranking 
system is a form of information-based regulation that is backed up by 
the incentives provided by common law liability, and as such avoids 
the trappings of “command and control” regulation that is likely to 
inspire the strongest opposition from regulatory critics. Second, our 
approach minimizes federal preemption of state programs; federal 
rules would merely dictate which sites could be subject to strict 
liability.305 Third, the imposition of enhanced liability on lower-ranked 
sequestration sites is supported by principles of economic efficiency 
and mitigated by the modest magnitude of the risks and liabilities at 
stake. 
 
 304.  See, e.g., John M. Broder, House Republicans Take E.P.A. Chief to Task, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 10, 2011, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/science/earth/ 
10emissions.html; Paul Krugman, Op-Ed, Party of Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, at A35, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/opinion/party-of-pollution.html. 
 305.  Similar kinds of limited preemption of state common law are not unprecedented. For 
example, under CERCLA, the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) 
added provisions that dictate the trigger date for statutes of limitations for certain common law 
actions. 42 U.S.C. § 9658 (2006). Without changing state statutes of limitations themselves, 
SARA provides for a new commencement date for the “applicable limitation period;” 
specifically, the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that the personal 
injury or property damages were caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or 
pollutant at issue. Id.; see Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F. Supp. 692, 704 n.13 (D. Kan. 1991) 
(rejecting Tenth Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges to SARA). 
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The status of CCS as a new technology subject to a variety of 
informational constraints is another critical factor that places 
significant limits on ex ante regulation. In particular, the near-term 
releases projected by scientists to be the most significant—those from 
faults or abandoned wells—will be extremely difficult for a general 
regulatory regime to mitigate.306 Accordingly, ex post liability is both 
better suited to addressing them and has the political virtues 
identified above. 
These informational deficits, as we expect, are likely to diminish 
as deployment of CCS progresses. The experience and knowledge 
gained may allow the EPA’s formal regulatory program to become 
more discriminating and to gain the capacity to mitigate these types of 
near-term risks, which in turn could allow the EPA to develop a more 
refined approach to regulating sequestration sites. If this occurs, a 
pure regulatory approach may be preferable, particularly as it may 
allow for a more fine-grained, multi-level categorization of sites. In 
the interim, the rough two-level system of tort liability that we are 
proposing would partially fill this temporary gap by exploiting the 
complementary strengths of an independent government-based 
system for ranking sites and the incentives provided by a 
decentralized liability-based system. 
This hybrid framework would not be a cure-all, but that is 
neither achievable nor our objective. Throughout this article we 
wanted to examine the limits of tort liability in promoting safe 
deployment of CCS and how, given these constraints, tort liability 
could best be utilized towards this end. We have found that, for a 
variety of reasons, tort liability will be limited to playing only a 
supplementary role to traditional performance-based regulations. In 
this light, we have outlined how liability could be effectively 
leveraged in this secondary role; namely, to provide additional 
incentives for selection of low-risk sequestration sites. 
B.  Creating Complementary Regulatory and Liability Regimes 
Similar to other commentators, we believe that regulation of 
sequestration sites should be structured around the different stages of 
site operations (active operation and injection of CO2, site closure, a 
10 to 30 year period of post-closure monitoring and oversight, and 
finally long-term stewardship).307 We also agree that when a site 
 
 306.  See supra Part II.A. 
 307.  See supra Part II. 
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transitions to long-term stewardship, it should be transferred to a 
government entity that will have sole responsibility for the 
sequestration site, including all liabilities. 
However, our approach differs from other proposals in two 
primary respects: First, it emphasizes measures to promote selection 
of the safest sequestration sites and, in doing so, places less reliance 
on site monitoring and close oversight by federal regulators. Second, 
our framework integrates a formal regulatory regime and common 
law liability through a comprehensive system of mapping and ranking 
potential sequestration sites. This ranking would be conducted by a 
federal agency (most likely the U.S. Geological Survey) and used to 
determine whether a site will be subject to strict liability. The 
Department of Energy has already compiled a national database of 
prospective reservoirs for sequestration of CO2, which would support 
such a national assessment.308 
We believe that a rough ranking of sequestration sites would be 
neither technically demanding nor cost-prohibitive.309 Well-
established methods are available to analyze key factors, such as the 
depth of a proposed reservoir, density and depth of existing wells in 
the area, quality of the primary rock seal above a reservoir, vertical 
distance to the deepest freshwater aquifer, presence of potentially 
transmissive faults, and location of other risk receptors (for example, 
valuable overlying natural gas reservoirs).310 We believe that the 
limited risk assessments needed to support such a ranking would, on a 
per-site basis, amount to a small fraction of the cost of a full site 
characterization.311 Equally important, the ranking would be based on 
data that are quite accurate and straightforward to interpret.312 
 
 308.  DOE ATLAS, supra note 30, at 26–29; see also Nicot & Duncan, supra note 60, at 17–
18. 
 309.  See Oldenburg, Screening, supra note 64, at 1693 (describing a simplified framework 
for analyzing and ranking sequestration sites according to their safety based on just three basic 
site characteristics); Zhang et al., supra note 61, at 42 (describing a simple framework for 
estimating leakage risks from sequestration sites). 
 310.  Andreas Kopp et al., A Contribution to Risk Analysis for Leakage Through 
Abandoned Wells in Geological CO2 Storage, 33 ADVANCES IN WATER RESOURCES 867, 878 
(2010) (identifying the primary parameters for safety as depth and geothermal gradient, both of 
which can be measured readily at the regional level); S. Julio Friedmann, Site Characterization 
and Selection Guidelines for Geological Carbon Sequestration 5–9 (Lawrence Livermore Nat’l 
Lab., Draft Document, 2007), available at https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/352172.pdf. 
 311.  The rough site characterization contemplated here would be limited to determining 
factors such as injectivity (the rate at which CO2 could be sequestered) that are essential to the 
viability of a site but are also relatively simple and inexpensive to measure. See generally J.G. 
KALDI & C.M. GIBSON-POOLE, COOP. RESEARCH CTR. FOR GREENHOUSE GAS TECH., 
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This informational approach draws on a hierarchical permitting 
system recently proposed by Jean-Philippe Nicot and Ian Duncan.313 
Under their scheme, a government agency would map, characterize, 
and rank deep brine reservoirs that are candidates for geologic 
sequestration of CO2.
314 Rather than linking this assessment to 
liability, Nicot and Duncan adopt a pure regulatory approach that 
tiers permitting requirements (such as the extent of testing and 
information requirements) to the rank of each site, and they further 
suggest that regional-level permits could be developed under which 
site-specific permits be fast-tracked.315 Consistent with our approach, 
their framework emphasizes passive geological safety characteristics 
(for example, reservoir depth and impermeable cap rock layers) and 
is intended to complement the EPA’s minimum performance-based 
standards.316 
The hybrid regulatory-liability framework that we propose could 
be used in conjunction with the Nicot-Duncan scheme, but the 
relative strengths of the two approaches will depend on specific 
attributes of the risks involved. As we have seen, two factors are 
critical to assessing the relative virtues of regulation versus liability: 
the latency of environmental harms and the information asymmetries 
between the private sector and the government.317 The greater the 
latency of leakage from carbon sequestration sites, the stronger the 
case for a pure regulatory regime and the less effective traditional 
common law liability. In opposition to this factor, the greater the 
information asymmetries between the private sector and the 
government, the more a liability regime is favored. 
While significant uncertainties remain, scientific modeling has 
shown that the latency for leakage of CO2 is likely to last for many 
decades after injection, whereas releases of brine could arise within a 
decade.318 If these projections prove accurate, the effectiveness of 
common law liability is likely to turn on the near-term risks 
 
STORAGE CAPACITY ESTIMATION, SITE SELECTION AND CHARACTERIZATION FOR CO2 
STORAGE PROJECTS 19–21 (2008), available at http://www.co2crc.com.au/dls/pubs/08-
1001_final.pdf; Kopp et al., supra note 310, at 878. 
 312.  See, e.g., OLDENBURG ET AL., RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 63, at 10; Bacanskas et 
al., supra note 93, at 2566. 
 313.  Nicot & Duncan, supra note 60, at 17–22. 
 314.  Id. at 17–18. 
 315.  Id. at 18–19. 
 316.  Id. 
 317.  See supra Part III.D. 
 318.  See supra Part I.B. 
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associated with brine releases. In general, lower-ranked sites, such as 
those in areas with many abandoned wells or with less reliable cap 
rock, will be more likely to leak early than highly ranked sites. 
Therefore, these characteristics would enhance the relative 
deterrence value of a liability regime for lower-quality sites. 
Information asymmetries will nevertheless persist with a federal 
site-ranking program, as it would be limited to basic site 
characterization data. More detailed and new site information will 
become available only during the active CO2 injection phase of a 
sequestration site.319 Moreover, while government regulations will 
require site operators to disclose at least some of this information, the 
EPA’s capacity to monitor operations and emerging reservoir data 
will be limited by resources and time.320 As a consequence, 
information asymmetries could very well increase as operations at 
sequestration sites evolve and site operators gain direct experience. 
The countervailing effects of latency and information 
asymmetries suggest three possible legal frameworks for the period 
spanning site selection, operation, and active post-closure. To the 
extent that latency is dominant, and thus liability largely ineffective, 
the Nicot-Duncan supplementary regulatory regime would be 
favored. Under this scheme, sites with lower scores could be subject 
to more stringent regulatory review and higher permitting fees (better 
sites could also be fast-tracked), CO2 mitigation credits could be 
discounted (if a U.S. market were established), or there could be 
some combination of both mechanisms.321 On the other end of the 
spectrum, if information asymmetries were dominant and latency 
minimal, a pure liability regime that incorporates a system of strict 
liability for all sites would be favored, as private knowledge would 
dominate. 
We have shown that the risks of releases from sequestration sites 
will involve a mix of near-term risks from faults or abandoned wells, 
which initial site characterization is unlikely to identify, and risks 
subject to substantial periods of latency.322 This mix of short- and 
longer-term risks combined with significant information gaps and 
asymmetries supports a hybrid regulatory-liability regime. While the 
 
 319.  Chadwick et al., supra note 265, at 272–73. 
 320.  See supra Part II.C. 
 321.  Nicot & Duncan, supra note 60, at 18 (noting that the fees generated could also be set 
aside to cover mitigation and remediation costs that arise after a site enters long-term 
stewardship). 
 322.  See supra Parts I.A.–B. 
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information gaps present when sites are permitted would undermine 
the efficiency of a tiered regulatory-only regime, they would not 
impede the effectiveness of an ex post liability regime. Similarly, 
while the latency of risks would erode the incentives provided by 
common law liability, minimum performance-based standards would 
place a lower limit on the effective magnitude of all risks, latent or 
otherwise, posed by sequestration sites. The regulatory and liability 
regimes thus complement each other by leveraging private knowledge 
to address risks that are inchoate when a site is permitted and by 
exploiting the robust public knowledge that is available upfront to 
establish minimum safety standards. 
This hybrid framework is consistent with principles of economic 
efficiency and a precautionary approach to environmental protection. 
By using strict liability to promote selection of higher quality 
sequestration sites but making selection contingent on well-
established criteria for site quality, the hybrid approach has the 
potential to mitigate industry opposition without sacrificing safety or 
efficiency. This approach is viable in significant part because a surplus 
of high-quality sites will exist for the next several decades, and it will 
be most effective during the early stages of CCS deployment when 
knowledge and experience are still being gained about the risks and 
reliability of sequestration sites. As the quality of information 
increases and the surplus of sites falls, we expect that the balance 
between regulation and liability will shift. Over time, more refined 
regulations will be possible, and the role of liability in providing 
meaningful incentives to select superior sites will diminish. 
C.  Early-Stage Carbon Sequestration Projects 
The urgency surrounding mitigation of CO2 emissions places a 
premium on facilitating rapid development of CCS. Yet, the large 
technical hurdles, uncertainties about the integrity of sequestration 
sites, and the extremely large upfront capital demands of CCS 
projects collectively present major barriers to its deployment. Broad 
consensus exists that large-scale pilot projects will be essential to 
overcoming these barriers, particularly as many of them cannot be 
assessed reliably without full-scale plants and sequestration sites.323 
 
 323.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, CARBON SEQUESTRATION TECHNOLOGY 
ROADMAP AND PROGRAM PLAN 7–8 (2007), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/ 
technologies/carbon_seq/refshelf/project%20portfolio/2007/2007roadmap.pdf; MIT, THE 
FUTURE OF COAL: OPTIONS FOR A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD 52–54 (2007), available at 
http://web.mit.edu/coal/The_Future_of_Coal.pdf. 
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Successful government involvement will almost certainly require 
some form of shared public–private projects, such as those 
incorporated into the failed Waxman-Markey climate change 
legislation that was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in 
July 2009 but was never taken up by the Senate.324 
Industry concerns about liability have prompted a number of 
commentators to suggest that limiting liability (for example, capping 
damages under strict liability, similar to the Oil Pollution Act325) for 
leakage from early-stage carbon sequestration sites could promote 
early entrants into the CCS industry.326 We believe that this is 
unnecessary because the projected magnitude of the potential 
damages is modest, implying that a cap would be unnecessary. Put 
differently, it would be extremely unlikely that the damages 
associated with releases from a sequestration site would ever exceed 
the strict liability cap. However, industry may still desire such a cap 
given the novelty of geologic sequestration. If the cap is set 
sufficiently high (that is, above reasonably projected impacts), it need 
not be inconsistent with our hybrid approach. We expect politically 
viable caps would not be a problem given the modest levels of the 
projected impacts, and we thus believe that there need not be a 
conflict between our tiered approach and those of other 
commentators. That said, in practice we anticipate that such liability 
caps will have little more than symbolic value. 
The need for additional incentives to encourage early entrants is 
significant, but the primary barriers to CCS deployment are the large 
upfront economic costs and remaining technological uncertainties, 
particularly with respect to capturing CO2. Addressing them will 
require creative use of public-private partnerships, tax incentives, and 
direct subsidies, each of which has been incorporated into prior 
climate change bills in Congress, most notably the Waxman-Markey 
bill.327 While each of these alternatives has significant fiscal 
implications at a time of economic austerity in the United States, the 
use of liability caps cannot surmount these barriers because they are 
not designed to mitigate or overcome them. Tort liability is directed 
at negative externalities, whereas the primary barriers to deployment 
 
 324.  American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 325.  See 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (2010). 
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of CCS involve unrelated technological uncertainties that will not be 
affected by a liability cap. 
One final point is worth highlighting: the complementary roles 
that regulation and tort liability can play are of particular importance 
to geologic carbon sequestration. The novelty of carbon sequestration 
is already raising public fears.328 Overcoming these fears will require 
concerted efforts by the industry, government, and non-governmental 
organizations to promote operational transparency and public 
understanding of carbon sequestration. 
Transparency can be compelled through regulations or liability 
suits.329 However, tort liability also creates disincentives for companies 
to collect information that could be used against them in a lawsuit.330 
Ensuring that regulations and tort liability are harmonized to 
promote transparency will be especially important because the 
industry will possess detailed site information that, unless obtained 
through regulatory channels, will not be available to state and federal 
agencies.331 Reporting requirements that apply to all CO2 emissions 
ought to ensure that most of the relevant information is public, but 
insofar as they do not, it will be imperative that sequestration-site-
specific reporting requirements are in place and rigorously enforced 
to ensure that regulations keep up with evolving sequestration 
technologies and knowledge.332 
CONCLUSION 
This article challenges several misconceptions about the risks 
associated with geologic sequestration of CO2 and the significance of 
open-ended legal liability. We have shown that the current debate is 
overly focused on the risks associated with CO2 leakage and 
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insufficiently attentive to the primary source of risk—releases of 
brine into drinking water aquifers. This oversight has important legal 
implications because the nature and timing of the two types of risks 
are quite different. As a general rule, releases of brine are much more 
likely and are projected to occur much earlier in the lifecycle of a 
sequestration site than releases of CO2. 
Understanding the nature of these risks, particularly their 
modest impacts and relative simplicity, ought to diffuse the 
controversy over legal liability for CCS. As we have demonstrated, 
loss of incentives provided by long-term liability is ultimately of 
negligible importance. Nevertheless, near-term liability can play a 
meaningful role, albeit a limited one, if it is directed primarily at risks 
associated with releases of brine. 
Our analysis also reveals that principles of economic efficiency 
support imposing either strict liability or negligence, although a 
stronger case exists for strict liability. We advocate a two-tiered 
system of liability that is based on two distinct classes of decisions—
site selection and operational judgments—that operates in parallel 
with minimum federal performance standards. This tiered hybrid 
approach leverages public and private information to enhance 
efficiency. However, we ultimately advocate this approach to mitigate 
problems with low political viability that would be associated with an 
effort to impose strict liability on owners or operators of 
sequestration sites. 
